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Most of what we commonly identify as "administrative law" is
elaborated through statutes and regulations, not as a direct expression
of constitutional authority.
Accordingly, this analysis of
administrative practice under the 1974 Constitution necessarily
addresses not only constitutional language but also includes statutory
and regulatory references.
The article begins with a look at two of the most significant
administrative reforms accomplished by the 1974
Constitution-increased openness in administrative practice and
reorganization of the executive branch of state government. It then
examines rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act' (with
particular focus on the legislative veto in Louisiana) and briefly
considers four new developments in the adjudication process since
1974. The article next suggests several innovations in administrative
practice that might comfortably be accommodated within the current
constitutional framework and concludes with an assessment of the
road traveled by administrative practice since adoption of the 1974
Constitution.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
A. Openness in AdministrativePractice
A new provision in the 1974 Constitution established a
presumption of openness in government and laid a solid foundation

1. La. R.S. 49:950-970 (1987) [hereinafter "APA"].
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for vigorous open meetings2 and public records3 laws by providing
that: "[n]o person shall be denied the right to observe the
deliberations ofpublic bodies and examine public documents, except
in cases established by law." This new provision guaranteed citizens
a right not found in the U.S. Constitution.5 In effect, it established a
"default" provision of openness, a constitutional "presumption that
public meetings... are open to the public unless a specific law denies
access." 6 This constitutional guarantee "opens up" the Open
Meetings Act in at least two respects. First, a "convening" that may
not be within the defined term "meetings" but that does fall into the
undefined broader realm of "deliberations" 7 must be opened to the
public. Second, entities expressly covered by the definition of
"public body" are required by statutory mandate of the Open
Meetings Act to open their meetings to the public, but other entities
neither encompassed in nor excluded by statute from the definitions
2. La. R.S. 42:4.1 (1990) (the "Sunshine Act").
3. La. R.S. 44:1 (1982).
4. La. Const. art. XII, § 3 ("Right to Direct Participation").
5. Bruce V. Schewe, Comment, Entering the Door Opened: An Evolution of
Rights ofPublic Access to Governmental Deliberations inLouisiana and a Pleafor
Realistic Remedies, 41 La. L. Rev. 192, 195 (1980).
6. IX Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973:
Convention Transcripts at 3073 (Jan. 3, 1974). Delegate Jenkins further observed
that "in cases where there is no law on the subject" or "if there has not been a
specific denial of the right to public access, then access would be allowed." Id.
See also Lee Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution: A Reference Guide 187
(1990).
7. Schewe, supra note 5, at 199 n.34 (quoting Professor Lee Hargrave:
"Notice the word is 'deliberations'-not 'meetings.' It is broader than simply
'watching the meetings.' No matter how a statute might classify meetings, ... the
constitutional reference is to 'deliberations.' . . . The right is with respect to
deliberations, and the presumption is in favor of openness." Hargrave, speech
before 1978 PAR Annual Conference, Know vs. NO, A Casefor Open Meetings
and Public Records in PAR Analysis 21, 22 (March, 1978)).
8. "Unlike the statutory open meetings regime, the constitutional language is
unqualified in its applicability to public bodies." Id. at 201 n.45. Consider, as an
example, a federal lawsuit filed by All Congregations Together (ACT) against the
Corps of Engineers, et al., challenging the practice of a Community Based
Mitigation Committee (CBMC) in meeting privately to consider how $37,000,000
in federal mitigation funds should be expended to ameliorate the adverse effects of
an Inner Harbor Navigational Lock Replacement and Expansion Project. Holy
Cross Neighborhood Assoc., et al. v. Colonel Thomas F. Julich, et al., 106 F. Supp.
2d 876 (E.D. La. 2000). The Court rejected plaintiffs' theory that the CBMC was
required to hold open meetings by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C.
App. 2 §§ 1-15 (1996 and Supp. 2001). Nor did the CBMC meet the statutory
definition of a "public body" as defined in Louisiana's Open Meetings Act, La.
R.S. 42:4.1-11 (Supp. 2001), since it was not a "state, parish, municipal or special
district" entity. La. R.S. 42:4.2(A)(2) (1990). Despite these lacunae in federal and
state laws, the CBMC might be constitutionally compelled by Art. XII, § 3 of the
La. Const. of 1974 to open its meetings, because: "[n]o person shall be denied the
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could be required by constitutional mandate to open their
deliberations to the public.
The new constitution mandated for the first time9 that agency law
should be codified and accessible to the public, requiring that:
"[r]ules, regulations, and procedures adopted by all state
administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, boards, and commissions
shall be published in one or more codes and made available to the
public."' This provision supported various public informationI
requirements already found in the Administrative Procedure Act.

The Louisiana Administrative Code arose out of this mandate 2 and

has been continuously revised and supplemented by the Office of
State Register13 to encompass most of the state's regulations.
Even more significant than the changes in text are the changes in
context since 1974. Technology and the Internet have probably done
more than any statutory revision to enhance the public's access to
administrative regulations. The Louisiana Register and the Louisiana
Administrative Code are both available online at the website for the
Office of the State Register. 4 Federal regulations published in the
Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations can now be
found online as well. 15 The regulations of numerous states are also
available electronically.' 6
right to observe the deliberations ofpublic bodies and examine public documents,
except in cases established by law."
9. Hargrave, supra note 6, at 194 (characterizing Art. XII, § 14 as "an
innovation in the 1974 Constitution").
10. La. Const. art. XII, § 14. A word about semantics: this article uses "rules"
and "regulations" interchangeably and regards "procedures" as a type of rule or
regulation. The most recent edition ofBlack's Law Dictionaryalso uses the terms
interchangeably, defining "regulation" as: "[a] rule or order, having legal force,
issued by an administrative agency.

.

." and "rule" as: "[a] regulationgoverning

a court's or an agency's internal procedures." Black's Law Dictionary 1289, 1330
(7th ed. 1994) (emphasis added).
11. See, e.g., APA §§ 49:952, 954.1 (1987 and Supp. 2001).
12. La. R.S. 49:981-987 (Supp. 2001).
13. In an unfortunate choice of terminology, the APA repeatedly refers to the
"Department ofthe State Register." As we shall see, infra at 6-8, the Constitution
authorizes a total of no more than 20 departments in state government. The State
Register is part ofthe Division of Administration and should properly be referred
to not as a "Department" but rather as the "Office of the State Register."
14. Office of the State Register, Louisiana Register,
<http://www.state.la.us/osr/reg/register.htm> (last modified Aug. 8,2001); Office
of the State Register, Louisiana Administrative Code,
<http://www.state.la.us/osr/lac/lac.htm> (last modified Aug. 8 ,200 1).
15. United States Government Printing Office, Database List,
<http://www.access.gpo.gov/sudocs/db2.html> (last modified Oct. 24, 2001). See
also FirstGov, The Official Cite for U.S. Government Information, Services,
Transactions, and Forms, at <http://www.firstgov.gov> (last modified Nov. 5,
2001) (providing numerous links to federal law databases).
16. A wealth ofonline citations to administrative law sources can be found in
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Access to agency regulations is still a problem in Louisiana,
because parts of the Louisiana Administrative Code are either
incomplete or not regularly updated. The Associate Director of the
Law Library ofLouisiana recently highlighted some shortcomings:.
The hardest material to find concerns Public Health because
the compilation on theweb is not completed and the paper
version has not been republished since 1984. It is also
difficult to find Bulletins from the Department ofEducation.
In these cases, a researcher should check an agency website
or call the agency to find the current regulations.
When I began teaching agency rulemaking in 1989, I routinely
advised students who were seeking out-of-state regulations to call
law librarians in that state and ask them to copy and fax the
regulations, which at that time were available only in hard copy. In
the Age of the Internet and at the dawn of the proverbial New
Millennium, however, such machinations should no longer be
necessary. Requiring the public to check an agency's website or to
phone the agency for a copy of current regulations seems both
unduly burdensome and flatly inconsistent with the APA's statutory
mandate that "[t]he Louisiana Administrative Code shall be
supplemented or revised
as often as necessary and at least once
8
every two years."'
Constitutional principles of openness also extend to the
openness of courts for judicial review of administrative agency
actions. Delegates to the 1973 Constitutional Convention ("CC 73")
preserved the 1921 Constitution's assurance of"Access to Courts"' 9
William H. Manz, Guide to State Legislative and Administrative Materials (2000).

The book's Appendix at 551-53 lists several useful search engines for state
administrative law, including regulation tracking services for all 50 states. See,
e.g., Realer, Proposed Rules and Regulations, at <http://www.regalert.com> (last

visited Nov. 5, 2001); Statement, at <http://www.statenet.com> (last visited Nov.
5, 2001). For website linked to state-related databases, see Findlay, at
<http://www.findlaw.com> (last visited Nov. 5, 2001); Washburn University
School of Law, at http://washlaw.edu (last visited Nov. 5, 2001);
<http://www.state.[postal-abbreviation].us> (providing a "template" for state web

sites). See also OMB Watch, PluggedIn, Tuning Up: An Assessment of State
Legislative Website (March
2001),
available at
<http://www.ombwatch.org/npadv/2001/stlg/index.html> (highlighting the progress

and continuing work of state legislatures to deliver on the promises of "egovernment" through "one-stop" online legislative resource portals).
17. Catherine Lemann, @%$U"/o orHowtoFindAdministrativeRegulations,
New Orleans Bar Association Briefly Speaking, Aug. 2000, at 23.
18. APA § 49:954.1(A) (1987 and Supp. 2001).
19. "All courts shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy
by due process of law and justice, administered without denial, partiality, or
unreasonable delay, for injury to him in his person, property, reputation, or other
rights." La. Const. art. I, § 22.
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and went further with a new "Right to Judicial Review"
guaranteeing the following protections:
No person shall be subjected to imprisonment or forfeiture
ofrights orproperty without the right ofjudicial review based
upon a complete record ofall evidence upon which thejudgment
is based. This right may be intelligently waived. The cost of
transcribing the record shall be paid as provided by law.2"
This provision, which had no predecessor in the 1921 Constitution,
originated in the debate regarding "Rights of the Accused."'" Although
most subsequent jurisprudence has arisen in the context of criminal
proceedings, the language can also be invoked to support the right of
judicial review from adverse administrative decisions. The comments
of one CC 73 delegate, who spoke in opposition to the proposed
amendment before it was approved, expressly recognized its
applicability to judicial review of agency decisions:
As I read this amendment, this amendment will provide for
judicial review of all administrative agency determinations
where anybody loses any rights for which he may be an
And by adopting
applicant, or any rights that he may possess....
this amendment, you will be providing forjudicial review of, in
my opinion, all administrative agency determinations.23
These constitutional guarantees of"Access to Courts" and the "Right to
Judicial Review" provide parties who have been disappointed in the
administrative process an opportunity to air their grievances further in the
courts.
B. Executive Branch Reorganization
Reorganization of the executive branch of state government
constituted one ofthe most significant developments in administrative
An important
practice arising out of the 1974 Constitution.
be
the first word
may
not
development, it certainly was, but "interesting"
that comes to mind for most readers. A drone's sense of duty impels me
to burden this article with an account of reorganization, but the reader
20. La. Const. art. I, § 19.
21. La. Const. art. I, § 13.

22. See, e.g., Something Irish Co. v. Rack, 333 So. 2d 773, 775 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1976) (acknowledging in an eviction proceeding "the rights ofjudicial review
and free access to the courts granted by" Art. I, Sections 19 and 22); Harris v.
Dupree, 322 So. 2d 380, 383 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975) (recognizing in a medical
malpractice case that the "right to appellate review is a constitutional right (Article

I,Section 19).").
23. VI Records of the Louisianan Constitutional Convention of 1973:
Convention Transcripts, at 1135 (Sept. 6, 1973).
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who is not in love with bureaucracy should feel free to trip lightly past

this section.
The 1921 Constitution and its numerous amendments overloaded
the state's organic law with far too many details about administrative
entities such as port and highway commissions24 or levee boards.25
The 1921 Constitution also imposed few limitations on the number
of agencies, boards, and commissions; as a consequence, they
proliferated at some cost to the state's taxpayers.26 By the late 1960s
it had become clear to the state's pre-eminent governmental research

organization that "Louisiana is far out of line with other states in the
number of state agencies. No state has as many, and the national

average was only about one-fourth the number in Louisiana. Of the

45 states for which information was available, only eight, including
The need for
Louisiana, had more than 100 agencies."2'7
reorganization of state government played a major role in the 1971
gubernatorial campaign 28 and constituted one of the new
administration's clearest commitments 29 when delegates convened in
1973.
CC 73 delegates recognized the need to dramatically redesign an

executive branch of government that had mushroomed into a

profusion of relatively independent agencies and that lacked any
overriding structure by which the governor could control or direct

those agencies' operations. 30 A contemporaneous analysis by the
24. See, e.g., La Const. of 1921, art. VI ("Administrative Officers and
Boards").
25. See, e.g., La. Const. of 1921, art. XVI ("Levees").
26. See 1969 Louisiana State Agencies Handbook at v (1979), which
documented "the trend toward a massive, top-heavy executive branch" by tracking
the growth ofexecutive branch agencies during the 1950s and 1960s. A report by
the Pubic Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc., The Executive Branch of
State Government, identified 151 agencies in 1951-a number that increased to
217 in 1960,231 in 1964, and 256 by 1968.
27. 1969 Louisiana State Agencies Handbook at vii-viii (1969) (citing 1
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Fiscal Balance in the
American Federal System (1967)).
28. Public Affairs Research Council, State Government Reorganization: The
End of the Beginning, PAR Analysis 231, Oct. 1978, at 3.
29. "Governor Edwards had suggested a cabinet-style reorganization during
his campaign, and CC 73 adopted his idea by mandating reorganization of all
existing agencies ...." Mark T. Carleton, FundamentalSpecial Interests: The
Constitutionof1974, in In Search of Fundamental Law: Louisiana's Constitutions
1812-1974 (Warren M. Billings and Edward F. Haas eds., 1993).
30. Louisiana House of Representatives, State and Local Government in
Louisiana: An Overview 11 (December 1987) [hereinafter House Overview]. This
introduction to state and local government in Louisiana is revised quadrennially to
serve as background information for newly elected members of the Louisiana
House of Representatives. Copies are available from House Legislative Services,
P.O. Box 44486, Baton Rouge, LA 70804.
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Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc. reached the
following conclusion:
One of the most significant defects in Louisiana's state
government is its administrative structure. This structure is
weakened by the multiplicity of separate agencies and by the
fragmentation ofauthority among numerous elected officials
and commissions which enjoy special constitutional
protection. A modem and efficient administrative structure
would require a major reorganization consolidating the
existing executive agencies into a manageable number of
major departments under the direction of the governor.3
The 1974 Constitution directed the legislature to reorganize the
executive branch within three years after its effective date32 into not
more than twenty departments.33 The first reorganization measure3 4
created the Joint Committee on Reorganization of the Executive
Branch, which led legislative reorganization ofstate government until
its termination on June 30, 1978Y
1. StatutoryImplementation ofReorganization
The Executive Reorganization Act36 consolidated approximately
three hundred independent agencies into twenty departments and the
offices of the governor and lieutenant governor, eliminating eightyeight agencies in the process.37 The degree of each agency's
independence and control under the new reorganization plan was
determined by its assignment to one of several transfer mechanisms,
or "transfer types," 38 consisting of four major categories: maximum
independence, where the agency retained its policymaking,
rulemaking, licensing, regulatory, enforcement, adjudicatory and
advisory powers as well as control over most personnel matters; 39
independence with regard to policymaking matters, but where the
31. Public Affairs Research Council, Constitution '74: PAR Voters Guide to
the Proposed Constitution 13 (1974).
32. La. Const. art. XIV, §6. The legislature's constitutionally mandated initial
allocation of functions, powers, duties, and responsibilities within the executive
branch was not subject to veto by the governor.
33. La. Const. art. IV, § I(B).
34. 1975 La. Acts No. 720. See also 1976 La. Acts No. 513.
35. Public Affairs Research Council, State Government Reorganization: The
End of the Beginning, PAR Analysis 231, Oct. 1978, at 3.
36. 1977 La. Acts No. 83 (codified at La. R.S. 36:1-960 (1985 and Supp.
2001)) [hereinafter Transfer Act].
37. Public Affairs Research Council, The Rise and Fall of Reorganization,
PAR Analysis 248, Jan. 1981, at i.
38. House Overview, supra note 30, at 13.
39. See generallyLa. R.S. 36:801, 801.1, 801.2-801.5, and 809 (1985).
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department controlled personnel and fiscal matters;40 advisory powers
only; 4 ' complete departmental control of the entity (usually an
institution or facility).4 2 A fifth category provided for variations
specifically tailored to the functions of licensing boards, retirement
systems, and agricultural promotion agencies.43 In addition, the
Transfer Act abolished outright a number ofagencies and transferred
their functions to a department."
The 1974 Constitution perpetuated two constitutional
agencies-the Public Service Commission ("PSC")45 and the Civil
Service Commission ("CSC"). 46 Relying on its direct constitutional
authority to "adopt and enforce reasonable rules, regulations, and
' the PSC successfully argued to the Louisiana Supreme
procedures,"47
Court that its rulemaking powers are not subject to the procedural
constraints imposed on state agencies by the Administrative
Procedure Act 4 8 Even though it is not bound by the rulemaking
requirements of Louisiana's APA, the courts' interpretation of
"reasonable" rules must be informed by APA procedures. 49 The 1974
Constitution also vested the CSC with direct rulemaking authority.50
Subsequent court decisions have held that CSC rules have the effect
of law5 ' and that they prevail over conflicting statutes.52 The
constitution provides for appeals from PSC decisions to the district
courts with a right of direct appeal thereafter to the Louisiana
Supreme Court.3 CSC appeals go by constitutional directive to the
courts of appeal.54
In addition to the PSC and CSC, the 1974 Constitution also
makes reference to several other entities, such as the Pardon Board,"

40. See generallyLa. R.S. 36:802, 802.1-802.11, and 804-807 (1985).
41. See generallyLa. R.S. 36:901-919.6 (1985 and Supp. 2001) (Part III of
Chapter 22 of Title 36).
42. See generallyLa. R.S. 36:851-857 (1985) (Part II of Chapter 22 of Title
36).
43. See, e.g., La. R.S. 36:803 (1985).
44. See La. R.S. 36:921-927 (1985) (Part IV of Chapter 22 of Title 36).
45. La. Const. art. IV, § 21.
46. La. Const. art. X.
47. La. Const. art. IV, § 2 1(B).
48. Louisiana Consumers' League, Inc. v. Louisiana Public Serv. Comm'n.,
351 So. 2d 128 (La. 1977).
49. Id. at 131-32 & 132 n.4.
50. La. Const. art. X, §§ 10(A)(1), 10(A)(4).
51. See, e.g., Bannister v. Dep't of Streets, 666 So. 2d 641 (La. 1996).
52. See, e.g., Frazier v. Dep't ofState Civil Serv., 449 So. 2d 95 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1984).

53. La. Const. art. IV, § 21(E).
54. La. Const. art. X, § 12.
55. La. Const. art. IV, § 5(E).
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the State Bond Commission, the Interim Emergency Board," and
various state educational boards, parish school boards, special
districts, and historic district commissions."s The State Board of
Ethics, which now regulates both elected officials and public
employees, arose out of the constitutional mandate for a Code of
Ethics 9 that was derived from an earlier provision in the 1921
Constitution.6"
6

2. Developments Subsequent to InitialReorganization
In the three-year period after adopting the new constitution,
reorganization of the executive branch reduced state agencies from
about 300 to 281.* Within a year or two after this initial
reorganization, however, the number had climbed to 325.62 And by
the early 1980s, the improvements brought about by the new
constitution had already been seriously eroded, according to one
study: "[t]he Legislature and governor have failed to continue
reorganization of state government with the result that agencies
continue to multiply, and overlapping and duplication continue
unabated. The result is inefficient and ineffective operations of state
government. 6 a Various governors and legislatures have continued
ever since to tinker with the structure of the executive branch.
Some changes required that existing departments be eliminated
or consolidated in order to make way for new executive branch
agencies. This "zero sum" game was an outgrowth of the
constitutional limit on "not more than twenty departments"' in the
executive branch of state government. Legislation establishing the
Department of Environmental Quality 65 made room for a new
56. La. Const. art. VII, § 8.
57. La. Const. art. VII, § 7.
58. See the citations to 15 public entities referenced in Richard D. Moreno,
Comment,
Louisiana's Constitutional Agencies: Plenary Powers or
"Constitutional Illusions ofBeing a Fourth Branch of Government? ", 51 La. L.
Rev. 875, 903 n.128 (1991).
59. La. Const. art. X, §21 directs the legislature to enact a code of ethics. The
statutory implementation of that directive is found at La. R.S. 42:1101-1170
(1990).
60. La. Const. of 1921, art. XIX, § 27(4) established a Board of Ethics for
Elected Officials.
61. Public Affairs Research Council, The Rise and Fall of Reorganization,
PAR Analysis 248, Jan. 1981, at 5.
62. Id.
63. Id. at ll.
64. La. Const. art. IV, § I(B).
65. 1979 La. Acts No. 449 established the Environmental Control Commission
within the Department of Natural Resources at La. R.S. 30:2001-2380 (2000 and
Supp. 2001 ) (originally enacted as La. R.S. 30:1051-1055), which was amended
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department by merging the formerly separate Departments ofPublic
Safety and Corrections into a single unit. The First Extraordinary
Session of 1988 split the Department of Health and Human
Resources into the Department of Health and Hospitals and the
Department of Social Services,66 eliminating the Department of
Urban and Community Affairs in order to accommodate the split.
Some departments underwent a name change or reassignment
within the structure of the executive branch. In 1986, the
Department of Culture, Recreation, and Tourism (CRT)67 was
placed in the office of the lieutenant governor, who appoints the
secretary and supervises its operations. CRT is unique in this
regard, because all other departmental secretaries are appointed by
the governor with consent ofthe Senate and serve at the governor's
pleasure.6" In 1988 the Department of Commerce became the
Department of Economic Development (DED),69 which houses
many of the professional licensing boards and commissions in state
On November 7, 2000, Louisiana voters
government.70
emphatically rejected a proposed constitutional amendment 7' to
"privatize" the functions of DED in "Louisiana, Inc.," a quasiprivate, state-funded corporation that would have been exempt from
civil service and most public bid laws.72 In 1989, during the
administration of Republican Governor Charles E. "Buddy"
Roemer, III, the Department of Labor became the Department of
Employment and Training. 73 Three years later in the administration
of Democratic Governor Edwin W. Edwards, the legislature
reversed itself, and the name reverted to Department of Labor.74
in 1983 to create the Department of Environmental Quality.

66. 1988 La. Acts, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 1
67. See S.B. 281, 12th Legis. Sess. (La. 1986).
68. House Overview, supra note 30, at 12.

69. 1988 La. Acts No. 563.
70. See Title 46 of the Louisiana Administrative Code, listing more than 40

entities with the authority to promulgate "Professional and Occupational

Standards." Office ofthe State Register, Online Publications of the Administrative

Code, availableat <http://www.state.la.us/osr/lac/title.htm> (last modified Aug.
28, 2001).
71. 2000 La. Acts, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 153 placed Amendment No. 1 on the
ballot; the voters rejected it by a greater than 2-1 margin. Stewart Yerton, Agency
to PursueLouisianaInc. Vision; Voters Reject Plan,But Goals StillBeckon, The

Times Picayune, Nov. 12, 2000, at A1.Inits 2001 Regular Session, the legislature

approved La. H.B. 1666, effecting a less ambitious reorganization of the

department that did not require voter approval. Governor Foster signed the
measure into law as Act 9 of the 2001 Regular Session.
72. Jack Wardlaw and Ed Anderson, Foster'sTax RevisionPackageFails,The
Times Picayune, Nov. 8, 2000, at E12.

73. 1989 La. Acts No. 512.
74. 1992 La. Acts No. 447.
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The legislature has constitutional authority to convert certain
statewide elective offices to appointive positions by atwo-thirds vote."
Until recently, only one such position, Superintendent of Education,
had in fact been converted,76 though bills are routinely introduced in
most legislative sessions proposing such changes.' The legislature used
its conversion and consolidation powers for the first time in over 15
years when it approved legislation in the 2001 regular session to
eliminate the Department ofElections and Registration by merging its
functions with those ofthe Department of State.' The elective post of
Commissioner ofElections had its origins in a 1950s political squabble
between then-Governor Earl K. Long and Secretary of State Wade 0.9
Martin, from whose grasp certain election functions were wrested.
The current Commissioner of Elections, Suzanne Haik Terrell,
campaigned successfully against her predecessor on a platform of
reform that included possible elimination of the office.8" Newspaper
accounts of impropriety and indictments arising out of her
predecessor's tenure"' laid a foundation of public and legislative
support for elimination of the office. The position enjoyed even less
support after the prior officeholder's recent conviction on federal and
state felony charges.8" The current Commissioner's willingness to see
her elective office made appointive clearly enhanced the prospects for
passage of legislation in the 2001 regular session. 3
In at least one instance, a significant new entity in state
government emerged independently of the legislature. The 1974
75. La. Const. art. IV, § 20 authorizes the legislature by two-thirds vote to
convert from elective to appointive positions the commissioner of agriculture,
commissioner of insurance, superintendent of education, or commissioner of
elections. The legislature may also merge or consolidate their departments and
may reestablish any of them as elective positions by the same two-thirds vote.
76. 1985 La. Acts No. 444.
77. See, e.g., S.B. 13, 27th Legis. Sess. (La. 2001), proposing to convert the
elected office of the Commissioner of Insurance to a position appointed by the
governor.
78. See H.B. 18, 27th Reg. Sess. (La. 2001).
79. See Jack Wardlaw, Fowler in Race of His Career,The Times-Picayune,
Oct. 6, 1999, at Al.
80. Id. See also Jack Wardlaw, Let's Fix a 44-Year-Old Mistake; Days are
NumberedforElectionPost,The Times-Picayune, Aug. 27, 2000, atA4; Editorial,
Move GrowingforAppointees, Baton Rouge Advocate, Nov. 30, 1999, at 8B.
81. SeeEd Anderson, ElectionsChiefHopefulsRip FowlerAgain,The TimesPicayune, Oct. 22, 1999, at A2; Scott Dyer, FieldFightingHardforElectionsJob,
Baton Rouge Advocate, Oct. 10, 1999, at Al.
82. Former Commissioner of Elections Jerry Fowler entered guilty pleas to
state felony charges on November 27, 2000. Michelle Millnollon & Christopher
Baughman, FowlerPleadsGuilty; FormerElections Official FacesMore Than 4
Years, Baton Rouge Advocate, Nov. 28, 2000, at Al.
83. Ed Anderson, Elections Chief OKs Revamping Office, The TimesPicayune, Feb. 13, 2001, at A3.
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Constitution never contemplated the Office of Inspector General
(OIG),*which Governor Roemer created in 1988 by executive
orders.8" In 1989, proposed legislation85 sought to establish the
office statutorily in an effort to prevent a new governor from
eliminating it through the simple expedient of allowing previous
executive orders to expire by operation of law.86 The bill was
defeated, but the OIG has nonetheless survived through the
administrations of three different governors; each allowed Bill
Lynch, the sole Inspector General to date, to maintain his position.
Governor Edwards renewed the office by executive order in 1992,
but removed from its jurisdiction colleges and universities as well
as statewide elected officials.87 When Governor Murphy J. "Mike"
Foster, Jr. took office in 1996, he declined to issue a new
executive order, but the Inspector General continued to operate
with his acquiescence.
In litigation initiated by the Inspector General, courts have
found independent constitutional and statutory support for the
office. Roemer v. Guillot88 located the origins of the OIG in the
governor's authority "to take an unclassified aide position in his
office and place that aide in charge of the Division of
Administration Internal Audit Section, thereby creating the
'
The court upheld creation of the OIG by
Inspector General." 89
reference to the governor's oversight authority over all budget
units 9° and express statutory9 and constitutional 92 authority to
delegate these powers. Edwards v. Board of Trustees of State
9" relied on the same sources
Employees Group Benefits Program
of authority to find "both constitutional and statutory authority,
apart from any Executive Order, for the Inspector General to do
his delegated duties." 94

84. Exec. Order B.R. 88-10, 14 La. Reg. 211 (1988), created the Office of
Inspector General and defined its authority. Exec. Order B.R. 88-26, 14 La. Reg.
592 (1988), established the "Inspector General's Office/Internal Audit" within the
Division of Administration.
85. S.B. 749 (La. 1989) by Senator William Jefferson.
86. Unless otherwise provided, an executive order terminates "sixty days
following adjournment sine die of the regular session of the legislature after the
issuing governor leaves office." La. R.S. 49:215(C) (1987).
87. Exec. Order EWE 92-59, 18 La. Reg. 1042 (1992).
88. 616 So. 2d 711 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992).
89. Id.at712.
90. La. R.S. 39:7 (1989).
91. La. R.S. 39:8 (1989).
92. La. Const. art. IV, § 5.
93. 644 So. 2d 776 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994).
94. Id. at 778.
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II. RULEMAKING UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

Since its enactment in 1966, 95 Louisiana's APA has undergone
numerous changes.96 Many ofthe changes enacted since the adoption
of Louisiana's new Constitution in 1974 have lengthened the
rulemaking process and placed various obstacles in the path ofagency
policymakers-particularly environmental policymakers. We begin
with a look at conventional and emergency rulemaking under the
APA, then review special procedures applicable to fees. Next, we
examine special-interest provisions applicable to environmental and
family issues and conclude with an extended analysis ofLouisiana's
"legislative veto" in its multiple incarnations.
A. ConventionalRulemaking
The timetable for promulgating agency regulations has grown
steadily longer over the years since CC 73. In 1974, the APA
required that an agency give "at least twenty days notice of its
intended action" before adopting, amending, or repealing any rule.9 7
By the following decade, the APA required that an agency give
"notice of its intended action at least fifty days prior to taking action
on the rule. '98 And by the beginning of the next decade, the APA
required both notice of intended action and "a copy of the proposed
rules at least ninety days prior to taking action. '
In 1993, a significant new source of uncertainty and potential
delay entered the APA rulemaking process. 00 Earlier versions of
Section 968 established a definite timetable for the legislative
oversight subcommittee hearing.'"'
By contrast, the 1993
amendments created a "gap" in the middle ofthe rulemaking process
so that the countdown to a legislative hearing begins only after an
agency delivers its report0 2 on the agency hearing to the appropriate
95. 1966 La. Acts No. 382. See Karen M. Karre, Louisiana's "New"
AdministrativeProcedureAct, 35 La. L. Rev. 629 (1975).
96. For a good analysis of the APA and its amendments through the first
fifteen years, see Robert Force and Lawrence Griffith, The Louisiana
Administrative ProcedureAct, 42 La. L. Rev. 1227 (1982) and sources cited
therein.
97. APA § 953(A)(1) (1975) in 1974 La. Acts No. 284.
98. APA § 953(A)(1) (1987) in 1983 La. Acts No. 713.
99. APA § 953(A)(1) (2001) in 1990 La. Acts No. 1063.
100. 1993 La. Acts No 119.
101. "Any such [legislative] hearing shall be conducted after any hearing on the
same rule is conducted by the agency pursuant to R.S. 49:953(A)(2) and not later
than forty days after the publication of notice of intended action on the rule in the
State Register." APA § 968(D)(1) (1987), as enacted by 1983 La. Acts No. 713
(emphasis added).
102. Note that the agency actually must deliver two separate reports to the

2001]

DAVID A. MARCELLO

legislative subcommittees: "any [legislative] subcommittee hearing
on a proposed rule shall be held no earlier than five days and no later
than thirty days following the day the [agency] report... is received
by the subcommittee."' 03 The agency's delivery ofits report activates
the second half of the rulemaking process.
Not until the agency delivers its report does the clock again begin
ticking toward a legislative oversight subcommittee meeting, which
can be held from five to thirty days later. The statutory language is
somewhat misleading, requiring the agency to furnish its report to the
subcommittees "at least five days prior to the day the legislative
oversight subcommittee hearing is to be held on the proposed rule."'0 4
It is not when the legislative oversight subcommittee meets that
determines when the agency's report must be delivered, but rather the
other way around. When the legislative oversight subcommittee may
meet is determined by when the agency delivers its report. The
agency is the action-forcing party in this process.
The 1993 legislation was an "administration" bill, proposed by
DEQ at the start of newly inaugurated Governor Edwards' fourth
term in office. According to DEQ legislative staff,0 5 the statutory
time limit of forty days afforded inadequate time for the agency to
process public comments on DEQ's long, complex proposed rules.
As a consequence, the summary report might not be delivered until
the day of the committee hearing, when distrustful committee
members, industry representatives, or environmentalists would
sometimes oppose the rule simply because they were uncertain what
it contained. Changes in the proposed rule might be styled
"substantive" (even though they were not) in order to take advantage
of additional time in the rulemaking process.'0 6 DEQ therefore
proposed legislation to do away with the statutory time limit so that
its staffwould have more time in preparing and disseminating reports
to the public.
Whatever the rationale may have been, the net effect of these and
other changes has been to extend significantly the amount of time
appropriate legislative oversight committees. The first is submitted at the
beginning of the promulgation process "on the same day the notice of the intended
action is submitted to the Louisiana Register for publication." APA § 968(B)
(1987 and Supp. 2001). The second comes later in the promulgation process and
summarizes the agency's public hearing and comment process. APA §
968(D)(1)(b) (1987 and Supp. 2001). The delivery of this latter report initiates the
countdown to a legislative oversight committee hearing.

103. APA § 968(D)(2)(a) (1987 and Supp. 2001).
104. APA § 953(A)(2)(b)(ii) (1987 and Supp. 2001).

105. I am indebted to Wade Adams, whose explanation regarding the
background of this legislative change and whose other observations about APA
practice in Louisiana were very helpful to me.
106. APA § 968(H)(2) (1987 and Supp. 2001).
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required for conventional rulemaking. 107 This additional delay by the
agency in preparing and delivering its report extends the rulemaking
process toward the APA's one-year deadline on final action, which has
remained unchanged since its adoption in 1981,18 when the timetable
for rulemaking required only 15 days' prior notice for adoption,
amendment, or repeal of a rule."°9
B. EmergencyRulemaking
In 1974, the sole basis for "emergency" rulemaking was "an
imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare."' " During the
next decade, the emergency rulemaking provisions were broadened to
include compliance with new federal regulations"' or "to avoid
sanctions or penalties from the United States.""' 2 Emergency
rulemaking took on its current form in 1990, when amendments added
three additional criteria to the original "public health, safety, or
welfare" formulation: "to avoid sanctions or penalties from the United
States, or to avoid a budget deficit in the case of medical assistance
programs or to secure new or enhanced federal funding in medical
assistance programs."' 3
This new terminology resulted from Congress' practice ofpassing
at the end of each calendar year an Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act" 4 loaded with new federal requirements that were invariably set to
become effective on the first day ofthe new year. The Department of
Health and Human Resources (DHHR) routinely confronted an
implementation problem: how to promulgate regulations that would
bring the state's Medicaid program into compliance with federal law
with only a few days' (or at best a few weeks') prior notice. Each year,
DHHR's lawyers responded to this threat by issuing an opinion to
authorize the adoption ofnew regulations via emergency rulemaking.
They justified these opinions by characterizing the threatened loss of
107. Most states only require aminimum ofapproximately twenty to thirty days

between the published notice of a proposed rule and its adoption by the agency.
Louisiana's minimum of 100 days stands in stark contrast. See Arthur E. Bonfield,
State Administrative Rule Making 170 n.5 (1986) [hereinafter Bonfield]; Arthur
E. Bonfield, State Administrative Rule Making 1993 Supplement 96 (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 Supplement]. Professor Bonfield's publications on state agency
rulemaking have established him as a leading scholar in this area, and I have drawn
extensively in this article upon his writings and research.
108. 1981 La. Acts No. 877.
109. See APA § 953(A)(1) (1981) in 1980 La. Acts No. 392.
110. APA § 953(B) (1966).
111. APA § 953(B)(1) (1987), as amended by 1983 La. Acts No. 713.
112. APA § 953(B)(1) (1987), as amended by 1984 La. Acts No. 953.
113. APA § 953(B)(1) (Supp. 2001), as amended by 1990 La. Acts No. 1085.
114. See, e.g., the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-203, 101 Stat. 1330.
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hundreds ofmillions offederal Medicaid dollars as "an imminent peril
to the public health, safety, or welfare." The rationale was surely
plausible enough, but the need for repeated reliance on this device
ultimately led DHHR's General Counsel, Charles Castille, to propose
legislation that explicitly authorized the use ofemergency rulemaking
to meet federal Medicaid requirements." 5
C. Fees
Between 1987 and 1995, the treatment of "fees" under the APA
traveled nearly full circle. The APA's definition of "rule" had been
interpreted as including fees since its adoption in 1966,'16 but fees
were expressly removed from that definition in 1987.117 Governor
Roemer used the legislative change to address a fiscal crisis,
generating additional revenues by increasing numerous fees11 that
would previously have required a lengthy (and politically
challenging) promulgation process under the APA. The politics of
fee increases by administrative fiat proved too troubling, however,
and the clear trend since then has been to restrict ever more severely
the power of agencies to increase fees.
In 1995, the legislature functionally reversed itself by amending
the "rulemaking" definition to provide as follows: "the procedures for
adoption of rules and of emergency rules as provided in R.S. 49:953
shall also apply to adoption of fees.""' 9 The APA still explicitly
excludes fees from the definition of a "rule," but incongruously, the
APA's "rulemaking" definition effectively reaches the opposite result
by subjecting fees to the same adoption procedure that applies to
rules. In fact, fees now undergo even stricter legislative review and
control than rules. A governor can unilaterally override the
legislative veto of a proposed rule change. 2 ° But if two legislative
subcommittees vote a proposed fee change "unacceptable," their veto
is definitive; the agency may not implement the change." I
The
most daunting challenge facing proposed fee increases, however,
derives from Act No. 1324 of 1995-a constitutional amendment that
requires a two-thirds vote ofthe legislature to enact most new fees or

115. My thanks to Charles Castille for helping to reconstruct the origins of this
legislative change.
116. 1966 La. Acts No. 382. The Federal APA treats fees as included in the
definition of "rule." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1994).
117. 1987 La. Acts No. 240.
118. LouisianaOKs FiscalPowersfor Governor,Los Angeles Times, Mar. 27,
1988, at A4.
119. APA § 951(7) (Supp. 2001), added by 1995 La. Acts No. 1057.
120. APA § 968(G), 968(H)(1) (1987 and Supp. 2001).
121.

APA

§ 971(A) (Supp. 2001).
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increases in an existing fee. 22 This constitutional change is likely to
fall with particular force on environmental regulators because in "the
last two decades, Louisiana has relied on fees rather than general
12 3
revenues to fund the Department of Environmental Quality.' ,
Effectively, it grants "veto authority over future fee increases" to
"entities subject to environmental regulation [which] have always had
more legislative influence
2 4 than would be necessary to assemble that
[one-third] minority."'
D. Obstacles to EnvironmentalRulemaking
Numerous "environmental" provisions that have found their way
into the APA are apparently intended to afford procedural safeguards
for industry against regulation by state agencies.2 5 Recent statutory
significant
changes in the APA
26 rulemaking process reflect a
environmental bias. 1
For example, the APA imposes special restrictions on the
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) when it "proposes a
rule that is not identical to a federal law or regulation or is not
required for compliance with a federal law or regulation."' 17 The
APA also requires various regulatory agencies to file with the
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) an index and summary of
regulations pertinent to oil and gas development, which are then
critiqued and consolidated into a Unified Oil and Gas Regulatory
DEQ must codify its rules and regulations in an
Index. 2
Environmental Regulatory Code and update it on a quarterly basis. 2 9
Certain permit applicants'" are afforded an expedited hearing ("out
122. La. Const. art. VII, §2.1(A) reads as follows:
Any new fee or civil fine or increase in an existing fee or civil fine
imposed or assessed by the state or any board, department, or agency of

the state shall require the enactment ofa law by a two-thirds vote of the
elected members of each house of the legislature.

The constitutional restriction on fee and fine increases does not apply to "any
department which is constitutionally created and headed by an officer who is

elected by majority vote ofthe electorate ofthe state." Id. at §2.1(B).
123. Kenneth M.Murchison, Recent Changes in Procedures ofthe Department
ofEnvironmental Quality, 57 La. L. Rev. 855, 869-70 (1997).

124. Id. at 868.

125. See the discussion of"rulemaking" in Murchison, supra note 123, at 85761.

126. "Even though they amend the Administrative Procedure Act rather than the
Environmental Quality Act, some of the most onerous of the new requirements
apply only to rules issued by the Department of Environmental Quality." Id. at
882.
127. APA § 953(F) (Supp. 2001).
128. APA § 954.2 (Supp. 2001).

129. APA §954.3 (Supp. 2001).

130. See La. R.S. 30:26 (Supp. 2001) and 30:2022(C) (2000), 49:214.30(C)(2)
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ofterm and in chambers") on a rule to show cause why apermit should
not be granted when the secretary 3 ' has failed to act within applicable
time periods. The rule to show cause "shall be denied by the court only
if the secretary provides clear and convincing evidence of an
unavoidable cause for the delay" and the permit "shall be granted
without further action ofthe secretary or the court" ifthe secretary fails
to grant32 or deny the permit within an additional time period set by the
court. 1

These and other procedural changes affecting DEQ have been
characterized as "an example on the state level ofarecent phenomenon
that has recently been documented on the federal level: using the
mantle of administrative reform to disguise a substantive goal of
reduced protection for the environment."' They are responsive to the
regulated community's desire "to avoid both regulations and
enforcement whenever possible" and "to reduce public input and to
delay regulation and enforcement when permanent avoidance is
impossible."' 34 Therefore, as viewed "from the perspective of the
regulated community," they were "highly desirable" changes."'
E. Family Impact
In another apparent concession to special interests, a 1999
amendment 36 to the APA now requires the preparation of a "family
impact statement" on every rule proposed by any agency. 37 Although
the section heading refers to a"penalty," the provision is silent as to the
consequences of failing to prepare and keep on file in the agency a
copy of the mandated statement. Some states that require a special
analysis of proposed rules focus upon the impact on small
businesses. 38 The rationale for such specialized studies is "to ensure
that the interests ofgroups with limited resources to defend'3themselves
receive special consideration in the rulemaking process."'

(Supp. 2001), and 56:6(26) (Supp. 2001).
131. The "secretary" in question may be from the DEQ [La R.S. 30:2022
(2000)], from DNR [La. R.S. 30:26 (Supp. 2001) and La. R.S. 49:214.30(C)(2)
(Supp. 2001)], or from the Department ofWildlife and Fisheries [La. R.S. 56:6(26)
(Supp. 2001)].
132. APA § 962.1 (Supp. 2001).
133. Murchison, supra note 123, at 884.
134. Id. at 880.
135. Id.
136. 1999 La. Acts No. 1183.
137. APA § 972 (Supp. 2001).
138. See 1993 Supplement, supra note 107, at 109-13 for a discussion of
"Special Analysis Requirements."
139. Id.at 112.
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F. Legislative Veto
A decade after CC 73, the United States Supreme Court decided
ImmigrationandNaturalizationService v. Chadha,40 which was the
"legislative veto" case invalidating Congress' attempt to statutorily
reserve a right ofreview and rejection over executive branch decision
making. 14 1 The Court held that Congress could not use a one-house
the constitutional requirements of
veto to circumvent
"presentment"' 42 and "bicameralism.' 1 43
Chadha concerned
or "quasi-judicial"
adjudicative
an
legislative intervention to overturn
shortly thereafter
Court
Supreme
the
but
administrative decision,
to legislative
principles
same
the
confirmed its intention to apply
functions as
"quasi-legislative"
or
review ofan agency's rulemaking
144
on the
impact
no
had
have
to
To date, Chadha appears
well.
145
a
entertain
someday
courts
If
the
legislative veto in Louisiana.
140. 462U.S.919, 103S.Ct.2764(1983).
141. The legislative veto was originally designed "to enhance administrative
leadership in the system by making it easier for members of Congress to delegate
new powers to the executive," but beginning in the late 1960s, "it began to serve
a growing congressional demand for procedural weapons to restrain executive
power." Jessica Kom, The Power of Separation: American Constitutionalism and
the Myth of the Legislative Veto 4-5 (1996).
142. Presentment requirements (presidential review and approval or veto of
proposed legislation) are found in U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which
shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it
becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States .... ") and art.
I, § 7, cl. 3 ("Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before
the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him,
shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives,
according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.").
143. Bicameralism requirements (passage of proposed legislation by both
houses of Congress) are found in U.S. Const. art. I, § 1("All legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.") and art. I, § 7, cl. 2
(preceding footnote).
144. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n , 691
F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom, United States Senate v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 1216, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
145. "The Louisiana courts have yet to directly address the legislative veto."
David A. Peterson, Louisiana'sLegislative Suspension Power: Valid Methodfor
Override ofEnvironmentalLaws andAgency Regulations?,53 La. L. Rev. 247,
260 (1992). The Louisiana Supreme Court addressed issues related to the
legislative veto in State v. Broom, 439 So. 2d 357 (La. 1983), when it applied the
"delegation doctrine" to first uphold, and then on rehearing, 439 So.2d at 365, to
invalidate, rules promulgated by the Secretary of Public Safety. Chadha,462 U.S.
919, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), which the United States Supreme Court decided in the
interim between the original and rehearing decisions in Broom, was mentioned in
the rehearing opinion, but only in support of the "bicameralism" requirement and
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Chadha-type argument attacking the legislative veto in Louisiana,
various of the factors discussed below should enter into their
evaluation of the issue.
We do well at the outset to define what we mean by the term
"legislative veto." This article classifies as a "legislative veto" any
mechanism by which the legislative branch ofgovernment can block,
reject, or invalidate regulations issued by an executive branch agency.
Thus, although Section 970 of the APA is styled "Gubernatorial
suspension or veto of rules and regulations,"' 46 it does not qualify as
a legislative veto because it concerns "blocking" action by the head
of the executive branch of state government, not by a legislative
entity. 4"' 7 The legislative veto presents a constitutional problem
because of Louisiana's "separation of powers" principles, which
restrict one branch ofgovernment from exercising
powers committed
4
by the constitution to any other branch. 1
Louisiana's Constitution and statutes expressly establish five
separate mechanisms that might each be characterized as a legislative
veto. In addition, the approval process for fiscal and economic
impact statements under the APA potentially creates a sixth such
mechanism. We will first examine the conventional legislative
oversight procedures for rules, then the separate process by which
proposed fee changes can be reviewed and vetoed by the legislative
branch. We next consider the process by which both rules and fees
are evaluated by the legislature following their emergency adoption,
then review two mechanisms--one constitutional, the other
as an example of"lip service" to separation ofpowers principles, shedding no light

on how its principles might apply to Louisiana's legislative veto provisions. Id. at
368, 369 n.21.
146. "The governor, by executive order, may suspend or veto any rule or
regulation or body of rules or regulations adopted by a state department, agency,
board or commission, except as provided in R.S. 49:967, within thirty days oftheir
adoption. Upon the execution of such an order, the governor shall transmit copies
thereof to the speaker of the House ofRepresentatives and president ofthe Senate."
La. R.S. 49:970 (1987).
147. The 1981 version of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act
(MSAPA) in Uniform Laws Annotated expressly approves gubernatorial review
and rescission or suspension ofagency rules, stating: "the governor may rescind or
suspend all or a severable portion of a rule of an agency." Model State Admin.
Procedure Act § 3-202(a), 15 U.L.A. 58 (1990). For a discussion ofthe legal and
policy considerations that distinguish gubernatorial review from the legislative
veto, see Bonfield, supranote 107, at 470.
148. La. Const. art. II, § I distributes the powers ofgovernment among "three
separate branches: legislative, executive, and judicial" and provides in Section 2
that "no one of these branches, nor any person holding office in one of them, shall
exercise power belonging to either of the others." Louisiana's constitutional
separation ofpowers is explicit; the U.S. Constitution has no comparable provision,
but implicitly requires such a separation ofpowers among the three branches ofthe
federal government.
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statutory-by which laws and regulations can be suspended by the
legislature. We conclude with observations about the approval
process for fiscal and economic impact statements-a process that
empowers the Legislative Fiscal Office to stymie rules proposed by
an executive branch agency.
1. Legislative Oversight
The legislative oversight procedures in APA Section 968 are the
"legislative veto" as it is conventionally understood by most courts and

commentators. The 1981 version of the Model State Administrative
Procedures Act (MSAPA) adopted by the National Conference of

Commissioners on Uniform State Laws addresses veto provisions in
Sections 3-202 through 3-204.
Legislative oversight procedures came into Louisiana's APA for
the first time in 1976,14' and legislative veto authority followed two
years later. 50 Each agency must submit a report on any proposed rule
or rule change to designated House and Senate standing committees or
to the presiding officers in each chamber.' The chair ofeach standing

committee must appoint an oversight subcommittee, which may consist
ofthe entire membership ofthe standing committee but must consist of
at least a majority ofthe entire membership. 5 ' By a simple majority of

149. 1976 La. Acts No. 279 added a new § 968 entitled "Review of agency
rules" and provided in subparagraph F(3) for a standing committee report finding
the rule "acceptable or unacceptable." The committee report had no effect,
however, on the rule's legal efficacy.
150. 1978 La. Acts No. 252 added a new provision at § 968 (F)(4) that
established for the first time a legislative veto that was subject to override by the
governor:
(4) If a committee having jurisdiction as provided in this Section
determines that a proposed rule change is unacceptable, the committee
shall provide a written report which contains the reasons therefore. Such
report shall be delivered to the governor. The governor shall have five
days in which to disapprove the action taken by the committee. If the
action of the committee is not disapproved by the governor within five
calendar days, from the day the committee report is delivered to him, such
proposed rule change shall not be adopted by the agency until such
proposed rule has been changed or modified and has been found
acceptable by the committee, or has been approved by the legislature by
If, however, the committee makes no
concurrent resolution.
determination with respect to a proposed rule change prior to the time
when the agency may adopt such proposed rule change as provided in
R.S. 49:953, or if the governor disapproves the action by the committee
as provided herein, the proposed rule change may be adopted.
151. APA § 968(B) (1987 and Supp. 2001) lists the appropriate House and
Senate standing committees or presiding officers for all executive branch agencies.
152. APA § 968(D) (1987 and Supp. 2001).
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the subcommittee members present and voting,'53 a subcommittee may
vote the proposed rule unacceptable.' 54 Unless the governor
disapproves the subcommittee's report55within ten days after receiving
it, the agency may not adopt the rule.
Louisiana's legislative oversight process suffers from the same
"bicameralism" problem that undermined Congress' action in
Chadha,since a mere handful of legislators meeting as the oversight
subcommittee ofa single chamber can veto aproposed rule simply by
finding it "unacceptable."' 56 The "presentment" challenge is weaker,
however, because Louisiana's APA allows the governor to review
and reject a legislative veto.'57 Gubernatorial override leaves the
executive branch ultimately in control of the rulemaking process.
Gubernatorial power to override a legislative veto of rules is even
stronger than gubernatorial power to veto legislation, because the
governor's rejection of the legislative veto is definitive" while the
governor's veto ofproposed5 legislation may be overridden by a twothirds vote of each house.'
2. Veto ofFees
Legislative oversight of proposed agency fee increases differs
critically from legislative oversight of rules. If both oversight
subcommittees determine "that the proposed fee adoption, increase,
or decrease is unacceptable, the fee action shall not be adopted by the
agency."' 6 This flat prohibition, not tempered by any opportunity for
153. APA § 968(E) (1987 and Supp.2001).
154. APA § 968(F) (1987 and Supp. 2001).
155. APA § 968(G) (1987 and Supp. 2001).
156. The APA specifies four bases on which an oversight subcommittee may
evaluate proposed rules. The first two appear to impose an "ultra vires" standard:
"(a) Determine whether the rule change or action on fees is in conformity with the
intent and scope of the enabling legislation purporting to authorize the adoption
thereof' and "(b) Determine whether the rule change or action on fees is in
conformity and not contrary to all applicable provisions of law and of the
constitution." Two subsequent provisions, however, make it plain that the
oversight subcommittee's discretion in reviewing proposed rules is essentially
unfettered: "(c) Determine the advisability or relative merit of the rule change or
action on fees" and "(d) Determine whether the rule change or action on fees is
acceptable or unacceptable to the oversight subcommittee." APA § 968(G) (1987
and Supp. 2001).
157. "[T]he governor shall have ten calendar days in which to disapprove the
action taken by the subcommittee." APA § 968(G) (1987 and supp. 2001).
158. "[I]f the governor disapproves the action of an oversight subcommittee
within the time provided in R.S. 49:968(G), the proposed rule change may be
adopted by the agency ..... " APA § 968(H)(1) (1987 and Supp. 2001).
159. La. Const. art. III, § 18(C)(1).
160. APA § 971(A) (Supp. 2001).
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gubernatorial override, renders the legislative veto of fees highly
suspect in16 1a Chadha type of analysis based on "formalist"
principles.
On the other hand, a "functionalist" mode of analysis might
regard the veto of fees more favorably. The functionalist approach
evaluates an exercise of legislative power in terms of its impact on
functions traditionally reserved for the executive branch. 162 Shared
legislative and executive responsibility for certain matters 163 can lead
to different outcomes even before the same court.'6 Where fees are
concerned, the courts might afford the legislature broader latitude

because the constitution distributes responsibility
for fees between the
65

legislative and executive branches.
It has been suggested that the recent constitutional amendment
barring a fee increase without a two-thirds vote of the legislature
161. A "formalist" approach to the separation of powers draws strict lines
between the tasks assigned to different branches of government and strikes down
as unconstitutional any task given by statute to an inappropriate branch. Chief
Justice Burger's opinion in Chadha reflects a formalist perspective on these issues.
For a discussion of the formalist-functionalist dichotomy, see Peter L. Strauss,

FormalandFunctionalApproachesto Separation-of-PowersQuestions-A Foolish

Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488 (1987).
162. "It is a relatively flexible approach that asks whether a given structural
arrangement intrudes too far on the functions of any branch of government, or
concentrates too much power in any branch." Michael Asimow et al., State and
Federal Administrative Law 455 (1998) (emphasis in original). The Louisiana
Supreme Court exhibited both "formalist" and "functionalist" modes of analysis
with respect to the institution of a civil enforcement action, traditionally an
executive branch function, in State Bd. ofElected Officials v. Green, 545 So. 2d

1031 (La. 1989), on rehearing,566 So. 2d 623 (1990). The Court first favored a
strict separation of executive and legislative branch powers by denying civil
enforcement authority to the legislatively appointed entity, then on rehearing
reversed itself by another 4-3 vote that focused less on the strict separation of
powers between the branches than on the legislature's "degree of control over the
appointees" and whether the statutory scheme would "significantly unbalance the
equilibrium sought to be established by the constitutional allocation of powers
among the various branches ofgovernment." Id. at 625-26.
163. See Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater?A Comment on
the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 Duke L.J. 789 (1983)

(defending the legitimacy of a legislative veto when used to control action in an
area of shared executive-legislative responsibility).
164. See, for example, the contrasting New Jersey Supreme Court cases of
General Assembly v: Byrne, 448 A.2d 438 (N.J. 1982) (striking down one
legislative disapproval of agency actions), and Enourata v. New Jersey Building
Authority, 448 A.2d 449 (N.J. 1982) (upholding the legislature's disapproval in
another instance).
165. La. Const. art. VII, § 2.1(A) treats a new fee or civil fine or any increase
in an existing fee or fine in the same manner as a tax, requiring "enactment ofa law
by a two-thirds vote of the elected members of each house of the legislature," a
shared legislative-executive branch responsibility because each such measure must
be presented to the governor for veto or approval.
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"effectively moots this provision because it requires affirmative
166
legislative action before a new or increased fee is imposed."'
Reports ofthe fee veto's demise are somewhat exaggerated, however,
because the constitutional restriction on fee increases does not apply
to "any department which is constitutionally created and headed by
an officer who is elected by majority vote of the electorate of the
state.' 67 Such a department can propose new or increased fees
without a two-thirds vote of the legislature, but it still must subject
those proposed fees to legislative oversight (and possible veto) under
the APA's rulemaking procedures.) 6s Another example of the fee
veto's continuing viability arises when an agency has statutory
authority to fix fees that do "not exceed"' 69 a certain amount. That
agency would use rulemaking procedures to increase fees from some
lesser amount (e.g., $50) up to the maximum (e.g., $100), and those
rulemaking procedures would give the legislative oversight
subcommittees an opportunity to veto the proposed fee increase.
3. Veto ofEmergency Rules and Fees
The two preceding sections discuss separate legislative oversight
procedures for rules and for fees adopted through conventional
rulemaking. A third veto provision combines legislative oversight of
both rules and fees that were adopted via emergency rather than
conventional rulemaking procedures.
An oversight 6ommittee of either house may unilaterally veto an
emergency rule or fee within sixty days after its adoption. 7 ' The
committee can evaluate whether the measure meets criteria for
emergency rulemaking, which consist of "imminent peril to the
public health, safety, or welfare" or various threats of diminished
federal funding.' 7 ' Or it can reject an emergency rule or fee for any
of the four reasons enumerated under conventional oversight,
which essentially amounts to an exercise of unfettered discretion
If the emergency adoption is unacceptable,
by the committee.'
and transmits a report in the same manner
prepares
the committee
166. Murchison, supra note 123, at 857.
167. La. Const. art. VII, § 2.1(B).

168. APA § 951(7) (1987 and Supp. 2001) defines "rulemaking" and provides
that "procedures for adoption of rules and of emergency rules as provided for in
R.S. 49:953 shall also apply to adoption of fees."
169. See, e.g., 2001 La. Acts, Reg. Sess., No. 296 authorizing the Louisiana
Board of Physical Therapy Examiners to adopt "in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act ...a schedule of fees which shall not exceed"
specified amounts.

170. APA § 953(B)(4)(a) (Supp. 2001).
171. APA § 953(B)(1) (1987 and Supp. 2001).
172. APA § 968(D)(3) (1987 and Supp. 2001).
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as under conventional oversight procedures.'
Upon receipt of
such a report by the agency,
"the
rule
or
fee
shall
be nullified and
17
shall be without effect.'
Nullification by a single oversight committee of either house
seems clearly offensive to Chadha principles. And unlike
conventional rulemaking, the governor enjoys no right of
subsequent review or opportunity to wrest ultimate control back
to the executive branch.'" What rationale might justify legislative
intervention into the realm of executive branch decision making
when an agency adopts rules or fees by emergency procedures?
Since emergency adoption affords no opportunity for either the
public or public officials to review the rule or fee in its preadoption phase, this extraordinary and non-participatory
"emergency" adoption process might create a need for
extraordinary post-adoption remedies. In fact, we see evidence of
such remedies in the APA. Affected members of the public, for
example, are given a special declaratory judgment action to test
the validity of an emergency rule or fee. The governor also gets
a review opportunity that is specific to emergency rule or fee
adoptions.' 71 Defenders of the legislative veto might agree that
these circumstances also entitle the legislature to an extraordinary
right of review as a means of maintaining "balance" among
separate branches of government.
In response, consider how criteria either govern or fail to
govern these various post-adoption review processes. The
governor's review of an emergency measure is essentially
unconstrained by criteria, but this causes no constitutional concern
under Chadha because it invokes no separation of powers
problem. In the realm of judicial power, an adversely affected
party can pursue the special declaratory judgment remedy "only on
the grounds that the rule or fee does not meet the criteria for
adoption of an emergency rule;'17 in addition, the rule or fee
remains in effect while being tested in the courts. 79 These
restrictions, coupled with the usual constraints of judicial
173. APA § 968(F)(2) (1987 and Supp. 2001).
174. APA § 953(B)(4)(c) (Supp. 2001).
175. APA § 953(B)(4)(b) (Supp. 2001) gives the governor the same 60-day
review period as the legislative oversight committee but no power to override the
committee's unfavorable decision on an emergency rule or fee.
176. "The provisions of this Paragraph are in addition to R.S. 49:963 and shall
not limit any action pursuant to R.S. 49:963." APA § 953(B)(3) (Supp. 2001).

177. APA §953(B)(4)(b) (Supp. 2001).
178.

APA § 953(B)(3) (Supp. 2001).

179. "Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the
emergency rule or fee shall remain in effect until such declaratory judgment is
rendered." Id.
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procedures and the adversarial process, render post-adoption
review by the judiciary an appropriate and reasonable assertion of
review power by one branch over the decisions of another. By
contrast, the legislature's veto power can be exercised without
regard to any limiting criteria, and legislative disapproval of an
emergency rule or fee takes effect immediately. This unfettered
discretion renders legislative oversight suspect, even in a context
of emergency adoption and possible "balancing" of powers
between two co-equal branches of government.
4. ConstitutionalSuspension
The Louisiana Constitution specifically authorizes the
legislature to suspend laws by concurrent resolution:
Only the legislature may suspend a law, and then only by
the same vote and, except for gubernatorial veto and time
limitations for introduction, according to the same
procedures and formalities required for enactment of that
law. After the effective date of this constitution, every
resolution suspending a law shall fix the period of
suspension, which shall not extend beyond the sixtieth day
after final adjournment of the next regular session. 180
The legislature can apparently renew its concurrent resolutions
repeatedly, thereby extending the suspension indefinitely.' 8 ' A
1991 analysis by the Public Affairs Research Council
characterized Louisiana's constitutional suspension procedure as
"unique" among the fifty states.' 82
The provision treats a concurrent resolution like a bill,
(majority or
requiring it to pass "by the same vote"' '
supermajority) and through "the same procedures and formalities"
180. La. Const. art. III, § 20.
181. In CC 73 debate on this provision, Delegate Asseff asked "Under your
amendment, would it not be possible for the legislature at the expiration of the
time, by following the same procedure to continue the suspension?" Delegate
Perez replied, "Yes, sir, that could be done, there is no question about it." V
Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973, Convention

Transcripts, at 455 (July 28, 1973).
182. Mark C. Drennan, Unique Power of Louisiana Legislature to Suspend
Laws, PAR Commentary, Oct. 1991, identified only three states that authorized
laws to be suspended by resolution-Iowa, Louisiana, and South Carolina-but the
resolutions in Iowa and South Carolina were subject to veto. Accordingly, the
monograph's author concluded, "Louisiana is the only state that authorizes
suspension of laws by resolution which is not subject to gubernatorial veto." Id.
at 2.
183. La. Const. art. III, § 15(G).
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(e.g., three readings and committee hearings in each house)'8 4 as
the bill originally enacting the law. A concurrent resolution
approved by the House and Senate thus satisfies the
"bicameralism" requirement, since it follows the same twochamber approval process that applies to a bill.
A resolution typically differs from a bill, however, in two
respects: it can be introduced at any time during a legislative
session, 8 5 and it does not go to the governor for review and
approval or rejection. 8 6 Because a resolution never crosses the
governor's desk, the procedure clearly does not comply with the
"presentment" requirement. But this is of no constitutional
consequence, because the use of a concurrent resolution to suspend
a statute enjoys express constitutional authorization and therefore
does not conflict with the "separation of powers" doctrine. 87
Should Louisiana's constitutional suspension procedure even
properly be characterized as a "legislative veto"? If the legislature
uses its power to suspend only statutes, that falls outside of our
earlier suggested definition: a legislative veto occurs when the
legislature rejects regulationspromulgated by an executive branch
agency. But the constitutional suspension provision refers to "law,"
and that term might be read broadly to include both regulations and
statutes. Can the legislature use a concurrent resolution to suspend
agency regulations, as it unquestionably can to suspend a statute?
The legislature has apparently proceeded on that assumption. 8
But the legislature's power to suspend agency regulations must be
scrutinized independently of its unquestioned constitutional power
184. La. Const. art. III, § 15(D).
185. Constitutional restrictions govern when bills may be introduced:
Any bill to be introduced in either house shall be prefiled no later than
five o'clock in the evening of the Friday before the first day of a regular
session; thereafter no member of the legislature may introduce more than
five bills, except as provided in the joint rules of the legislature.
La. Const. art. III, § 2(A)(1).
186. La. Const. art. III, § 17(B) regarding "resolutions" provides that "[n]o
joint, concurrent, or other resolution shall require the signature or other action of
the governor to become effective."
187. This provision overcomes Chadha-type problems only so long as the
legislature confines itself to actions expressly authorized by the constitutional
suspension provision. See the discussion of "law" infra at notes 188-198.
188. See, for example, proposed concurrent resolutions purporting to suspend
or nullify numerous environmental regulations during the 1991 regular session,
listed in Appendix A of Peterson, supra note 145, at 280-81. See also H.C.R. 211,
18th Legis. Sess. (La. 1992) (nullifying Wildlife and Fisheries regulations); H.C.R.
284, 19th Legis. Sess. (La. 1993) (suspending regulations of the Department of
Economic Development); H.C.R. 108, 23d Legis. Sess. (La. 1997) (repealing
regulations of the Department of Health and Hospitals).
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to suspend statutes. If.the constitutional reference to "law" in
Article III, Section 20 is read narrowly to include only "statutes"
and not "regulations," then attempting to suspend agency
regulations by a mere resolution exceeds the legislature's
constitutional suspension authority and is constitutionally suspect
as a violation of the separation of powers.
Post-1974 jurisprudence suggests that this narrow interpretation
of "law" is the correct one and accordingly that the legislature's
suspension of agency regulations is not well founded. In Board of
Elementary and Secondary Education v. Nix,'89 the supreme court
applied a narrow reading: "[w]hen used in this context, as it was in
103 other instances in the 1974 constitution, the term 'provided by
law' means 'provided by legislation. "'190
In support of its
interpretation, the opinion cited the Civil Code: "[flaw is the solemn
expression of legislative will."'' The Court was also guided by
interpretive principles embodied in the Style and Drafting Committee
reports of CC 73, which routinely substituted "the term 'by law' for
deemed-equivalent expressions of 'by the legislature' or 'by
statute.'""".
Linguistic context also suggests that "law" should be narrowly
interpreted to include only "statutes" and not "regulations." When
the constitutional suspension provision states that a suspension must
be accomplished "according to the same procedures and formalities
required for enactment of that law,"' it clearly contemplates
procedural conformity to the statutory enactment process for
legislation, not to APA rulemaking procedures for regulations. The
choice of language is also highly suggestive because we typically
refer to the enactment'14 of statutes exclusively (as opposed to the
term promulgation,' which is more inclusively applied to both
statutes and regulations).
Finally, the CC 73 debates yield no support for using this
procedure to suspend regulations. The delegates' comments focused
189. 347 So. 2d 147 (La. 1977).
190. Id. at 151 (emphasis omitted). See also State ex rel. Bd. of Ethics for
Elected Officials v. Green, 566 So. 2d 623, 624-25 (La. 1990).
191. Nix, 347 So. 2d at 151 (citing La. Civ. Code art. 1 (1870)).
192. Nix, 347 So. 2d at 151-52 (citing numerous entries in State of Louisiana

Constitutional Convention of 1973, Verbatim Transcripts (1973-74)). Professor

Lee Hargrave, the honoree of this symposium issue, authored numerous Style and

Drafting Committee reports.
193. La. Const. art. III, §20 (emphasis added).

194. Black's Law Dictionary 546 (7th ed. 1999) defines "enactment" as "The
action or process of making into law <enactment of a legislative bill>" and "A

statute 'a recent enactment. "'

195. Black's Law Dictionary defines "promulgation" as "The official
publication of a new law or regulation, by which it is put into effect." Id.at 1231.
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exclusively on the suspension of an "act" or a "statute" and on the
suspension of"legislation" or a "bill" by the same procedure through
which it was "enacted."'9 6 Specific references in debate to laws that
had been or might be suspended were all references to statutes.' 97
One delegate even questioned the origins ofthe constitutional suspension
procedure, suggesting that the only purpose of its predecessor provision
in the 1921 Constitution might have been to prohibit the governor from
suspending laws by "executory edict,"' 98 and that it was never meant to
confer on the legislature extraordinary suspension powers. Nothing in
the CC 73 transcripts implies that the constitutional suspension
procedure was ever intended to suspend anything other than statutes.
The legislature's constitutional power to "suspend a law" should be
narrowly construed, applied exclusively to statutes and not expansively
to include suspension of agency regulations. If the supreme court
ultimately accepts the wisdom of Chadha and applies its principles in
Louisiana, it should restrict the legislature's constitutional suspension
authority to statutes and prohibit its extension into the unsanctioned
realm ofregulations.
5. Statutory Suspension
The APA gives the legislature express statutory authority to block
agency regulations by concurrent resolution: "the legislature, by
Concurrent Resolution, may suspend, amend, or repeal any rule or
regulation or body of rules or regulations, or any fee or any increase,
decrease, or repeal of any fee, adopted by a state department, agency,
196. V Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973:
Convention Transcripts at 452-62 (July 28, 1973).
197. See e.g., id. at 452 (discussing the Lead Paint Law); id. at 454
(commenting that a measure subject to suspension "may be in the Civil Code, any
law, it could be the drivers license law, it could be the financial responsibility
law"); and id. at 460 (referencing to an act establishing requirements to take the
examination for real estate broker). The word "regulation" appeared only once and
that was regarding a bill introduced by Senator O'Keefe to regulate the safety of
glass doors. Id. at 456.
198. La. Const. of 1921, art. XIX, § 5 provided that "no power of suspending
laws in this state shall be exercised except by the legislature." See comments of
Delegate Triche:
[T]he original intent of that Article was not to grant the legislature any
specific authority to suspend laws... I think that what the people in the
convention of 1921 were trying to tell us was that laws should not be
suspended, and they were trying to guarantee, I believe, the people of this
state against rule by executory edict, to prevent the governor from
declaring emergency or martial law, to prevent the executive from
suspending laws by executive order and rule by edict, and I think that's
all it meant.
V Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention
Transcripts, at 459 (July 28, 1973).
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board, or commission."' 99 What are we to make ofthis grant of statutory
authority? No question about it, this provision clearly qualifies as a
"legislative veto" ofagency regulations. Statutory suspension explicitly
goes even further than the constitutional suspension provision, allowing
the legislature to "suspend, amend, or repeal any rule. 2' This statutory
suspension procedure enjoys no apparent constitutional authorization that
might immunize it from a Chadha-stylechallenge.
Statutory suspension has been characterized as "a legislative
assertion ofthe constitutional suspension power, ' 20 1 but that assertion
does not seem correct. Ifit were, then it should logically follow that
"the limits on the statutory suspension power are the same as the
limits on the constitutional provision, 2 2 and accordingly, no such
suspension could extend beyond the sixtieth day after final
adjournment of the next regular session. Section 969 nowhere
suggests any such limit on the exercise of statutory suspension
powers, and the legislature has not used its statutory suspension
powers in that restricted manner.
Statutory suspension procedures have caused concern in other
states. 20 3 Because they do not require "presentment" to the governor,
these procedures undermine equal access to the rulemaking process
by providing powerful interest groups with an opportunity to
influence agency policymaking processes, unchecked by the
balancing effect ofan alternate branch of government.2 4 Louisiana's
recent legislative history confirms that the statutory suspension
process is susceptible to political manipulation.2 5
When it was originally enacted in 1980,06 Section 969 allowed
the legislature to "nullify or suspend" any rule or regulation by
concurrent resolution.20 7 Just one year later, the 1981 version of the
199.

APA § 969 (1987 and Supp. 2001).

200. Id.
201. Peterson, supra note 145, at 259.
202. Id. at 275-76.
203. See State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House ofRepresentatives, 687 P.2d 622
(Kan. 1984) (holding unconstitutional a statute authorizing the legislature to adopt,
modify, or revoke administrative rules by concurrent resolution); State v.
A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980) (holding unconstitutional a
statute authorizing the legislature to annul agency regulations by concurrent
resolution).
204. Harold H. Bruff & Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control of
Administrative Regulation: A Study ofLegislative Vetoes, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1369
(1977); Marcus E. Etheridge, Consequences of Legislative Review of Agency
Regulationsin Three U.S. States, 9 Legis. Stud. Q. 161 (1984).
205. See David A. Marcello, The EthicsandPoliticsofLegislativeDrafting,70
Tul. L. Rev. 2437, 2444-46 (1996).
206. 1990 La. Acts No. 660.
207. Peterson, supra note 145, at 260 (observing that the legislature's
incorporation of statutory suspension power in the APA coincides "historically
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Model State Administrative Procedure Act repudiated that approach
and asserted a countervailing "principle that the legislature may
20 8
permanently nullify or suspend an agency rule only by statute.
Persuasive constitutional"° and policy"1 I considerations militate against
legislative nullification or suspension of agency regulations by less than
statutory means.
Even more troubling than the original version of Section 969 is its
current language, empowering the legislature to "suspend, amend, or
repeal" any rule or regulation." How far does the power to "amend"
extend? Is the legislature simply limited to excising offending language,
or may it go further and actually rewrite a regulation by adding new
language ofits own?212 The power to "amend" agency regulations by
with the passage of the Louisiana Environmental Procedure Act in the previous
legislative session .... and could indicate a desire on the legislature's part to use
Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:969 as a limit upon the expansion of the newly
created environmental agencies.").
208. See the commentary on the Model State Admin. Procedure Act § 3-204(c)
(198 1) in Bonfield, supra note 107, at 495 (emphasis in original), characterizing
the "consensus" view of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) as follows:
[T]he legislature should not be authorized to nullify or suspend an agency
rule by means other than the enactment of a statute. Therefore, according
to the 1981 MSAPA, legislative repeal or suspension of an agency rule
may be accomplished only by joint legislative action, subject to the veto
of the governor or to the overriding of such a veto. Because the
legislature initially authorized agency rule making by the enactment of a
statute, the legislature must use a statute to nullify or suspend a particular
product of that process.
209. Bonfield discusses constitutional reasons for rejecting ihe legislative veto
in Section 8.3.2(c) ofhis treatise, concluding that "in the absence of a constitutional
provision expressly authorizing such action, nonstatutory legislative vetoes or
suspensions ofparticular agency rules are probably impermissible under most state
constitutions." Bonfield, supra note 107, at 498. La. Const. art. III, § 20 is, of
course, just such an express constitutional authorization for the legislature to
suspend "law" by concurrent resolution-though for reasons set forth above, the
authorization should be read to encompass only "law" made by statutory enactment
and not to include regulations promulgated by an agency.
210. See Bonfield, supra note 107, at 507-14 (discussing policy reasons for
rejecting the legislative veto in Section 8.3.2(d)).
211. For examples of suspension and repeal, see H.C.R. 284, 19th Legis. Sess.
(La. 1993) (suspending provisions of the Louisiana Administrative Code that were
promulgated by the Office of Financial Institutions within DED to permit the sale
ofannuities by banks) and H.C.R. 108, 23d Legis. Sess. (La. 1997) (repealing rules
promulgated by DHH with regard to the Medically Needy Program).
212. Since APA §969 was amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1109, the legislature
has repeatedly used it to rewrite agency regulations. See, for example, H.C.R. 31,
23d Legis. Sess. (La. 1994) (amending a Family Independence Project rule of the
Office of Family Support in DSS); H.C.R. 94, 23d Legis. Sess. (La. 1994)
(amending rules ofthe Charitable Gaming Control Division in the Office of State
Police); H.C.R. 124, 23d Legis. Sess. (La. 1994) (amending DOTD rules to
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concurrent resolution-to rewrite them, in effect-pushes the legislative
branch well into the realm of executive branch decision making and
invites the courts to strike down this example oflegislative overreaching.
6. LegislativeFiscalOffice Approval
Every proposed rule published in the Louisiana Register must be
accompanied by a fiscal and economic impact statement that has been
approved by the Legislative Fiscal Office.2 13 The Louisiana Register

will not publish a Notice of Intent unless it is accompanied by an
approved fiscal and economic impact statement bearing the signatures
of personnel from both the agency and the fiscal office.214 No rule
can be adopted in substantial compliance with APA procedures unless
such an approved
statement has been published prior to its
adoption. 5

redesignate transit lanes on the Crescent City Connection Bridge); H.C.R. 2, 26th
Legis. Sess. (La. 1998) (amending a rule of the Board of Registration for
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors in DOTD); H.C.R. 6,25th Legis. Sess.
(La. 1999) (amending rules of the Charitable Gaming Control Division in the
Office of State Police).
213. The Legislative Fiscal Office was created by 1973 La. Acts No. 169 to
provide "service, research, and technical staffassistance concerning fiscal matters
of any kind to the members of the legislature and to the committees thereof." La.
R.S. 24:601 (1989). The office is wholly a creature of the legislature: "a service
agency of the legislature and in every aspect of its functions, duties and operations
shall be responsible solely to the legislature and to no other branch of the state
government." La. R.S. 24:608 (1989).
214. APA § 953(A)(1)(a)(ii) and (iii) (1987 and Supp. 2001) requires that the
agency's notice of intended action must include "[a] statement, approved by the
legislative fiscal office," of any anticipated fiscal or economic impact of the
intended action.
215. APA § 954(A) (1987 and Supp. 2001) requires that rules be adopted "in
substantial compliance" with the Act's procedural requirements. What constitutes
substantial compliance is a matter to be determined on the facts ofeach particular
case. Dorignac v. Louisiana State Racing Comm., 436 So. 2d 667, 669 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1983). Nonetheless, the APA identifies at least three specific requirements
that each agency must meet in order to achieve "substantial compliance" with its
rulemaking procedures: (1) "file a certified copy of its rules with the Department
of the State Register"; (2) "prior to its adoption a report relative to the proposed
rule change is submitted to the appropriate standing committee of the legislature
or to the presiding officers of the respective houses"; and (3) "the approved
economic and fiscal impact statements . . . [must] have been filed with the
Department of State Register and published in the Louisiana Register." APA §954
(1987 and Supp. 2001). The last of these three requirements cannot be met if the
fiscal and economic impact statement is not "approved" by the Legislative Fiscal
Office. Note also that Section 954(A) establishes a two-year prescriptive period
to challenge a rule based on procedural noncompliance: "A proceeding under R.S.
49:963 to contest any rule on the grounds of noncompliance with the procedures
for adoption, as given in this Chapter, must be commenced within two years from
the date upon which the rule became effective." Id.
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When the legislature adopted new language 216 requiring fiscal and
economic impact statements, it gave only superficial guidance about
the respective roles of the agency and the fiscal office in their
preparation and approval." 7 In 1987, the Attorney General issued an
opinion"' attempting to clarify the relationship by assigning
responsibilities in the following manner. The agency is responsible for
preparing statements and has ultimate control over their contents. The
fiscal office can identify deficiencies and suggest revisions, but the
agency ultimately decides whether to accept or reject these suggestions.
The fiscal office has the last word on the matter, however, because it
can either give or withhold approval of an agency's proposed
statement; withholding approval blocks publication of the agency's
Notice of Intent.
This situation obviously creates considerable potential for
stalemate. If the agency and the fiscal office cannot resolve a deadlock
over the content of a fiscal or economic impact statement, the fiscal
office can effectively "veto" proposed agency regulations by
withholding its approval, thereby denying the agency an essential step
in the promulgation process-publication in the Louisiana Register.
The exercise ofthis functional "veto" by the fiscal office is definitive
and cannot be overturned by further gubernatorial review (unlike the
"conventional" legislative oversight process conducted pursuant to
Section 968, which authorizes the governor to rescue the regulations by
gubernatorial override).
7. ConclusionsRegardingLegislative Veto
If the supreme court ultimately elects to apply Chadhaprinciples
in Louisiana, how might the various forms of legislative veto fare?
Legislative oversight under Section 968 may well survive the test,
because the governor's authority to override the legislative veto2 9
-preserves executive branch control of agency rulemaking. If the
governor can act to suspend or veto rules by executive order,2 is it not
equally permissible for the governor to accomplish the same result by
acquiescing in the actions of a legislative oversight committee?
Every other legislative veto mechanism reposes definitive control
in the legislative branch, and accordingly, all (save one) are
216. 1980 La. Acts No. 392.
217. APA § 953(A)(3)(a) and (b) (1987 and Supp. 2001) provides that the
statements of fiscal and economic impact "shall be prepared by the proposing
agency and submitted to the Legislative Fiscal Office for its approval," but does not
explain how to resolve conflicts between the agency and the fiscal office.
218. 87 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 87-752 (Nov. 9, 1987).
219. APA § 968(G) (1987 and Supp. 2001).
220. APA § 970 (1987).
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constitutionally suspect under Chadha. The one exception is, of
course, the constitutional suspension of statutes, which survives
unequivocally but should not be extended to the suspension of
resolutions.
And its illegitimate offspring, the statutory
suspension of regulations pursuant to Section 969, should be
struck down without equivocation as an unconstitutional intrusion
into the powers of the executive branch.
The definitive veto of fees under Section 971 might survive if
the Court applies a "functionalist" rather than "formalist" mode of
analysis and finds sufficient intermingling of legislative and
executive branch powers to support legislative intervention on
revenue-related measures. The equally definitive veto of
emergency rules and fees might be justified, if at all, only as an
extraordinary remedy to the extraordinary lack of public and
legislative participation in the emergency adoption process.
Since the legislative fiscal office is so wholly a creature of the
legislature, its ability to block the publication (and therefore the
adoption) of agency regulations should be evaluated as if the
" '
legislature itself were acting.22
The legislature's legitimate
interest inpublicizing the fiscal and economic impact ofproposed
regulations could be served by something less than an absolute bar
to the publication of the agency's Notice of Intent in the Louisiana
Register. For example, the fiscal office might publish its
independent and dissenting analysis of the proposed rule's impact
alongside the agency's own evaluation. This device would
promote public and legislative scrutiny of the rule, instead of
stifling it as is presently the case. It would also eliminate the
constitutional questions raised by current procedures for the
approval of fiscal and economic impact statements. The
legislature should address this subject in a further amendment,
delineating how the fiscal office and the agency should reconcile
differences over the content of statements and how they should
proceed in the event of an impasse.
III.

ADJUDICATION UNDER THE

APA

Another article waits to be written-this is not it-evaluating
significant changes in adjudication practice since 1974. Here,
with no pretense of comprehensiveness, are some observations
about just a few of the topics that might be addressed in such an
article.
221. Fiscal staff may enjoy even less justification than the legislature to block
agency action, because, unlike legislators, they hold no elective office and are
unaccountable to the public.

220

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 62

A. Division ofAdministrativeLaw
In 1996, the APA consolidated responsibility for adjudication
hearings in anew Division ofAdministrative Law ("DAL")"' located
within the Department of Civil Service. Administrative law judges
("ALJ's") hear cases involving the Departments of Public Safety
(driver's license revocation or suspension for traffic violations,
constituting approximately two-thirds of the Division's total
caseload), Wildlife and Fisheries (hunting and fishing license
violations), Health and Hospitals (sanitation code violations),
Environmental Quality, and Insurance." 3 During the year ending on
June 30, 2000, the Division docketed 11,322 new matters; conducted
8,623 hearings; settled 1,316 cases; and rendered 8,601 decisions or
orders. 24 DAL also offers mediation services. 2
Strong arguments can be advanced either to celebrate or to
condemn the consolidation of administrative appeals before a single
body of ALJ's.1 6 To its proponents, DAL provides an independent,
impartial, professionally trained corps of AL's, ending the
appearance of conflict that occurs when hearings are held before
227
AL's employed by the very agency whose interests are at stake.
Proponents also maintain that the Division puts an end to ex parte
communication between agency personnel and ALJ's, thereby
increasing public respect for the process and perhaps even increasing
compliance with administrative orders and decisions.
To opponents of such a system, the disadvantages outweigh its
benefits. A wide-ranging caseload challenges the ability ofALJ's to
acquire the depth of expertise needed to manage, for example,
222. APA §§ 991-999.1 (Supp. 2001) (enacted by 1995 La. Acts Nos. 739 and
947) and supplemented by APA §§ 999.21-999.25 (Supp. 2001) (enacted by 1997
La. Acts No. 1162). The 1981 version of the Model State Administrative
Procedure Act acknowledged a role for ALJ's at Section 4-202(a) and included a
provision establishing the central panel of ALJ's at Section 4-301.
223. Except as provided in APA § 992(D)(2)-(8), the DAL provisions "apply

to any board, commission, department, or agency ofthe executive branch of state
government" and to "all adjudications as defined in the Administrative Procedure
Act pursuant to the Procurement Code." APA §§ 992(D) and 992(E) (Supp. 2001).
224. My thanks to the Director of the DAL, Ann Wise, for supplying data and
other information about the division.
225. See State of Louisiana, Division of Administrative Law, at
http://www.adminlaw.state.la.us (last modified Oct. 22, 2001).
226. See Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise, AL] Independence, and
Administrative Courts: The Recent Changes in Louisiana's Administrative
ProcedureAct, 59 La. L. Rev. 431 (1999) and sources cited therein, particularly

footnote 5.
227. Malcolm C. Rich & Wayne E. Brucar, The Central Panel System for
Administrative Law Judges: A Survey of Seven States 9 (1983).
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complex environmental enforcement proceedings. Of even more
consequence, decisions rendered by AL's are binding on the agency,
which has no right of appeal from an adverse decision.228 The
concept of "judicial deference to agency expertise" becomes
somewhat suspect when the critical decisions are made not by agency
experts but by AL's who are wholly unaffiliated with the agency.
B. JudicialReview ofAgency DecisionMaking
Two concepts compete for dominance in Louisianajurisprudence
regarding judicial review of agency decisions. Some cases describe
the transition from the administrative process to the courts as a first
instance of "judicial review" invoking the original jurisdiction of
courts, while others label it an "appeal." The conflict is not simply
one ofterminology but one with significant conceptual ramifications
as well.
1. "Appeal" ofAgency Decisions Under the 1921 Constitution
Just a few years before CC 73 convened, two Louisiana Supreme
Court cases decided under the 1921 Constitution generated some
confusion about district courts' jurisdiction over "appeals" of
administrative action. In Trosclair
29v. Houma Municipal Fire
230 &
Police Civil Service Board"' andAlbert v. ParishofRapides, the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that district courts were relying upon
"appellate" rather than "original" jurisdiction in their review of
decisions by local fire and police civil service boards. Since the 1921
Constitution did not include "appeals" within the original jurisdiction
of district courts, the Court reasoned that a district court must have
3
express constitutional authority to hear such proceedings; '
228.

Bybee, supra note 226, at 432. APA § 992(B)(2) (Supp. 2001) provides

that "[i]n an adjudication commenced by the division, the administrative law judge

shall issue the final decision or order, whether or not on rehearing, and the agency
shall have no authority to override such decision or order." Bybee styles this "a

remarkable" and "an astonishing provision" noting that he "cannot find any other
state that has a provision identical" to it. Bybee, supra note 226, at 455-57.
Murchison, characterizes it as the "most pernicious" of the changes affecting
adjudication under the APA and discusses its incompatibility with conventional
concepts of the political accountability of agencies. Murchison, supra note 123,

at 873.
229. 252 La. 1, 209 So. 2d 1(1968).
230. 256 La. 566, 237 So. 2d 380 (1970).

231. Trosclairfound "limitedjurisdiction"in La. Const. of 1921, art. 14, § 15.1
and La. R.S. 33:2501 for the district court to hear "appeals" from the civil service
board. Trosclair,252 La. at 5-6, 209 So. 2d at 2 (emphasis in original). Because
the district court's review was limited and not an expression of its "exclusive
original jurisdiction," the Louisiana Supreme Court denied the Houma civil service
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otherwise, the "appeal" to a district court would be denied as
exceeding the jurisdictional power of district courts.232
Justice Hamiter's dissent in Trosclair rejected the view that
judicial review invoked the appellate powers of a district court
because "the [civil service] board is no court" and "proceedings
before the district court to determine the correctness of its ruling is
[sic] not an 'appeal.' 233 Instead, the dissent maintained, "the
procedure commenced in the district court was 'simply the institution
of a civil matter (not an appeal)' in that
234 court which had exclusive
original jurisdiction over the subject.
2. Rejection of "Appeal" Theory Under the 1921 Constitution
Just a few years later (and still prior to CC 73), Justice Hamiter's
dissenting view prevailed when Trosclairand Albert were overruled
in Bowen v. Doyal.235 Bowen, relying on the 1921 Constitution236 to
overrule earlier decisions, held that due process entitles a losing party
in the administrative adjudication process to judicial review by the
courts.237 Justice Barham drew an appropriate distinction between
"appeal" (appellate courts reviewing the decisions of a lower trial
court) and "judicial review" of administrative action (courts
reviewing for the first time an agency decision) in the following
forceful language: "[]udicial review ofadministrative determinations
should not be confused with judicial appeals. A district court's
review ofan administrative determination is not an appeal; it is in fact
an original judicial action."23 After Bowen, participants in the
board a right of appeal from the district court's adverse decision to the court of
appeal. Id. at 2-3 (emphasis in original).
232. Albert reached a different result from Trosclair,holding that La. Const. of
1921, art. 14, § 15.1 contained no express provision for district courts to review
decisions rendered by civil service boards in smaller municipalities. Albert, 256

La. at 571-72, 237 So. 2d at 381-82. Finding that the statutory attempt to confer
such authority exceeded the scope of the jurisdiction granted to district courts by
La. Const. of 1921, art 7, § 36, the Court dismissed the "appeal" to the district court
that Albert and other plaintiffs had filed in response to an adverse ruling by the

Rapides civil service board. Id.

233. Trosclair,252 La. at 8, 209 So. 2d at 3.
234. Id.
235. 259 La. 839, 253 So. 2d 200 (1971).
236. La. Const. of 1921, art. 1, § 6 ("Open courts; legal remedies"), which the
1974 Constitution preserved as "Access to Courts" in La. Const. art. I, § 22. The
1974 Constitution went further in protecting access to the courts by providing for
a "Right to Judicial Review" in La. Const. art. I, § 19: "No person shall be
subjected to imprisonment or forfeiture of rights or property without the right of
judicial review based upon a complete record of all evidence upon which the
judgment is based."
237. Bowen, 259 La. at 847-48, 253 So. 2d at 203-04.
238. Id. at 852, 253 So. 2d at 205.
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administrative process could rely on a simple semantic device to
maintain clarity in this area. "Appeal" could be used exclusively to
refer to appellate court review of lower court decisions, while the
transition from agency process to the courts was best described as
"judicial review" of agency action (not "appeal" from the agency's
decision).
The supreme court shed further light on these semantic and
conceptual distinctions in a decision rendered after adoption of the
1974 Constitution. Buras v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension
Fundof the City ofNew Orleansheld that statutory references to the
Board's decision as "final and conclusive" (from which there could
be "no appeal") simply signified "the point ofadministrative finality,
leaving to the courts the ultimate decision as to the validity of the
'
Administrative finality meant that
final administrative decision."239
no further appeal was possible within the administrative process, but
the agency's final and conclusive decision could still be challenged
by judicial review in the courts.
3. Restorationof "Appeal" Under the 1974 Constitution
Despite the clarity of Bowen and the Court's post- 1974 adherence
to its principles, old notions die hard. Touchette v. City of Rayne,
MunicipalFire& PoliceCivilService Board,2 4' decided a year after
the new Constitution took effect, first accepted the wisdom ofBowen
by asserting that "judicial review of an administrative decision is
essentially a different process than the appellate review of a district
court's judgment. 2 4' Touchette also appeared open to the
countervailing view, however-that a district court's review of an
agency decision might be an "appeal" rather than the exercise of its
original jurisdiction. The opinion mused that "even if the district
court review is an appeal,"" the court of appeal had jurisdiction
pursuant to expansive new language in the 1974 Constitution.2 43 This
early perpetuation of the "appeal" concept in the post-1974 era
acquired significant jurisprudential weight in subsequent years.
The original majority opinion in LOOP, Inc. v. Collector of
Revenue244 took these musings to a higher level, citing Touchette in
239. Buras v. Bd. of Trs. of Police Pension Fund of City ofNew Orleans, 367
So. 2d 849, 851 n.4 (La. 1979).
240. 321 So. 2d 62 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1975).
241. Touchette, 321 So. 2d at 64.
242. Id.
243. "Appellate jurisdiction is no longer based on the nature ofthe jurisdiction
exercised by the district court. This court now has jurisdiction over all civil
matters decided within its circuit subject to exceptions specified in the
Constitution." Id.
244. 523 So. 2d 201 (La. 1987).
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support of the proposition that judicial review invokes appellate
rather than original jurisdiction. The court in LOOP held that "a
legislative act establishing procedures for judicial review of an
administrative tribunal decision by a district court, should properly be
considered to be a law providing for that court's appellate
jurisdiction. ' 245 The supreme court reversed itself on rehearing but
approvingly mentioned both the pre-1974 reasoning of Bowen v.
Doyal and the post-1974 expanded "appellate jurisidiction" of the
district courts, thereby perpetuating confusion about which principle
applies to the courts' consideration of agency decisions---judicial
review" or "appeal."246
The supreme court emphatically resolved matters in American
Waste & PollutionControlCo. v. StateDepartmentofEnvironmental
Quality,247 holding that a court's first instance ofjudicial review over
agency decision making "is an exercise of a court's appellate, rather
than original, jurisdiction." 248 The Court dismissed competing
jurisprudence with a retrospective characterization that "the Bowen
court chose to construe what was actually appellate review of agency
determinations as 'original jurisdiction,' 2 49 despite the Bowen court's
unambiguous assertion that "a district court's review of an
administrative determination is not an appeal; it is in fact an original
judicial action."25
In reaching these conclusions, the court in American Waste relied
on new language in the 1974 Constitution regarding the appellate
jurisdiction ofdistrict courts. Precisely how did the 1974 Constitution
change the appellate jurisdiction of district courts?
4. Analysis of Changesin the 1974 Constitution
The 1921 Constitution enumerated four specific categories in
which district courts could exercise appellatejurisdiction.25 ' The 1974
245. Id. at 203 n.1.
246. Id. at 202-03.
247. 588 So. 2d 367 (La. 1991).
248. Id. at 370.
249. Id.
250. Bowen v. Doyal, 259 La. 839, 851, 253 So. 2d 200, 205 (1971).
251. La. Const. of 1921, art. 7, § 36 conferred on the district courts appellate
jurisdiction of the following cases:
All appeals in civil cases tried by justices of the peace within their
respective districts; all appeals in civil cases tried in city or municipal
courts within their respective districts where the amount in dispute, or the
value of the movable property involved does not exceed one hundred
dollars, exclusive of interest; all appeals from orders of justices of the
peace requiring a peace bond; and all appeals from sentences imposing a
fine or imprisonment by a mayor's court or by a city or municipal court.
Notably, all of the categories refer exclusively to lower courts; none contemplate
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Constitution eliminated this list of categories and shifted authority
from the constitution to the legislature to designate by statute those
matters over which the district courts might exercise appellate
jurisdiction: "A district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as
' These changes made the allocation of appellate
provided by law."252
authority for district courts a matter, of statutory law, not
constitutional directive.
Nowhere, however, do the constitutional convention transcripts
suggest an intent to characterize a district court's review of nonjudicial, agency proceedings as an exercise of the district court's
"appellate" jurisdiction. When giving examples of the appellate
jurisdiction of district courts, CC 73 debates referred exclusively to
appeals from "limited jurisdiction courts" or "courts below" or
"courts ofrecord" or "inferior courts" (principally mentioning parish
courts, city courts, and mayors' courts).253 This usage was consistent
with the 1921 Constitution, which also referred exclusively to lower
courts in its provision regarding appellate jurisdiction of district
2 54

courts.

Nor do the CC 73 debates suggest any intent to remove judicial
review of agency decision making from the original jurisdiction of
district courts. Under the 1974 Constitution, district courts have
"original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters. '25 5 In 1990,
the Supreme Court interpreted this jurisdictional grant as allinclusive, signifying:
an intent by the [CC 73] drafters to include all matters not
criminal in nature as "civil matters" under the district court's
original jurisdiction. Nothing in the constitution suggests any
intent that a separate category of innominate matters should
be excluded from these all-inclusive terms.256
The only proceedings expressly excluded from the grant of original
jurisdiction are "administrative agency determinations" in worker's
compensation matters,257 which suggests by implication that all other
administrative agency determinations ought properly to be included
within the original jurisdiction of district courts. DEQ permitting
decisions would seem to be such an administrative agency
determination.
"appeals" of agency decisions.

252. La. Const. art. V, § 16(B).
253. VI Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973:
Convention Transcripts at 795-800 (Aug. 17, 1973).
254. La. Const. of 1921, art. 7, § 36.
255. La. Const. art. V, § 16(A).
256. Moore v. Roemer, 567 So. 2d 75, 79 (La. 1990).
257. La. Const. art. V, § 16(A).
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Just one year after its "all-inclusive" interpretation rendered in
Moore v. Roemer, the Court held in American Waste & Pollution
Control Co. v. State Department of Environmental Quality that
DEQ permitting decisions are "not civil matters within the meaning
of' the constitutional grant of original jurisdiction to district
courts.258 The Court acknowledged that the constitutional "grant of
original jurisdiction in all civil matters to the district courts
contemplates first instance judicialadjudications," but effectively
held that this constitutional grant of original jurisdiction could be
diminished by statute where "the first instance adjudication has
' In so holding, the
been delegated by the Legislature to the DEQ."259
Court apparently equated a first instance administrative
adjudication by DEQ with a first instance judicialadjudication by
a court. Even if rendered in a quasi-judicial agency proceeding,
however, a DEQ decision still seems in fact to be only quasi-judicial,
issued by an agency of the executive branch and not by an Article V
court.260 The dissents by Justices Marcus and Hall raised some of
" ' but the majority
these same questions,26
unambiguously embraced
the proposition that judicial "review ofDEQ's permitting decisions
clearly represents an exercise of appellate review of quasi-judicial
' not an exercise
determinations,"262
of a district court's original
jurisdiction.
5.CurrentState ofJudicialReview
Jurisdiction to review the decisions of administrative agencies
can generally be given to either district or appellate courts. 263 The
matter is one to be determined by statute or by constitution.
Recognizing this reality, the 1981 MSAPA offers alternative
provisions: one lodges jurisdiction in trial courts, the other in courts
of appeal. 2" Under both the 1921 and 1974 Constitutions,
Louisiana has recognized a right to judicial review of administrative

258. 588 So. 2d 367 (La. 1991). See also MEDX, Inc. v. Templet, 633 So. 2d

311, 314 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
259. American Waste, 588 So. 2d at 372 (emphasis added).
260. An administrative hearing officer is not a "judge" within the meaning of
Article V, and the decisions rendered in a quasi-judicial capacity by an
administrative body do not qualify as the "judgment" of a court. Walker v.
Conagra Food Servs., 671 So. 2d 1218 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1996). See also Hogan
v. G & J Pettit, 687 So. 2d 680, 680 n.1 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1997) and Spencer v.
Gaylord Container Corp., 693 So. 2d 818, 822 n.2 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997).
261. American Waste, 588 So. 2d at 374, 375.
262. Id. at 370.
263. 2 Am. Jur. 2d AdministrativeLaw § 422 (1994).
264. Model State Admin. Procedure Act § 5-104(a) (1981).
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proceedings.265 Cases decided under both constitutions have varied,
however, on whether that right involves an exercise of original
jurisdiction by the district courts or whether it constitutes an "appeal"
to the district courts or courts ofappeal. American Waste appears to
have resolved the matter by stating that "[j]udicial review ofa decision
of an administrative agency is an exercise of a court's appellate
jurisdiction, and the Legislature may constitutionally repose such
appellate review in the court of its choice."266 The twists and turns of
prior jurisprudence in this area suggest, however, that the matter may
be revisited at some point.267 If so, the courts might consider which
judicial forum (district or appellate) does more to build public
confidence in the administrative process.
Initiating judicial review of administrative decisions in the courts
oforiginal jurisdiction would give litigants an assurance of"two bites
at the apple" in the courts, instead of a single "appeal" to the
intermediate courts and an uncertain application to the Louisiana
Supreme Court for writs thereafter. Affording litigants their fullest
possible "day in court" would respond to the complaint that agencies
constitute an unresponsive, anti-democratic "fourth branch" of
government. Testing agency outcomes in the courts not once but
twice might encourage greater care and deliberation by agencies and
seems likely to increase public confidence in the judicial system's
oversight of agency proceedings. Courts oforiginal jurisdiction may
also be better equipped than appellate courts to devote the time and
attention required for reviewing detailed administrative records. Even
if the courts decide not to revisit the matter in the future, these policy
considerations should discourage the legislature from passing new laws
that direct judicial review of agency decisions to the appellate courts.
265. Bowen v. Doyal, 259 La. 839, 854, 253 So. 2d 200,205-06 (1971); Brock
v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 520 So. 2d 711 (La. 1988).
266. American Waste, 588 So. 2d at 373.
267. A recent decision, Duplantisv. LouisianaBd. of Ethics, 782 So. 2d 583
(La. 2001), found constitutional authority for "direct appeal to the court of appeal

of a decision by the Board." Id. at 590. The supreme court stated that "[i]n the
absence of this provision, jurisdiction for judicial review would be vested in the

district court." Id.at 590-91. This statement apparently affirms the view that firstinstance judicial review of administrative agency decisions resides in the original

jurisdiction of district courts. But compare an even more recent case, Metro
Riverboat Asssociates,Inc. v. The LouisianaGaming ControlBoard, No. 0 1-C0185,2001 La. LEXIS 2852 (Oct. 16, 2001), where the Louisiana Supreme Court
cited approvingly the holding of American Waste that "judicial review of the

decision of an administrative agency . . . is an exercise of a court's appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to La. Const. art. V, §16(B)." Id.at *9. InMetroRiverboat,
the 19th Judicial District Court enjoyed both original and appellate jurisdiction
over decisions ofthe Gaming Control Board, giving rise to considerable confusion
among the litigants and the courts below about the jurisdictional basis on which the

suit was proceeding.
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C. The ChoiceBetween Rulemaking andAdjudication
A recent Attorney General's opinion requires the Board of
Ethics (acting as the Supervisory Committee on Campaign Finance
Disclosure) to make new law by promulgation of a rule rather than
the release ofan advisory opinion.2 6 This opinion raises substantial
questions about the law-making powers of administrative agencies
in Louisiana and, if inappropriately applied in the future, could do
much to undermine the effectiveness of agencies. Let's look at
what the advisory opinion said and why the Attorney General's
Office concluded that the Supervisory Committee had engaged in
substantive rulemaking.
The Supervisory Committee sought "to provide general
guidelines as to the use of campaign funds"2 69 and to identify
criteria for distinguishing between personal and campaign related
expenditures under the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act.2 0 Its
advisory opinion first listed and briefly summarized fifteen previous
opinions on the subject, then "reaffirmed" and "incorporated" those
opinions, but "with the following modification: campaign related
activities or matters relating to the holding ofpublic office must be
the primary purpose" of the expenditure.2 " The Supervisory
Committee also adopted the following interpretive principle:
In order to further assist candidates and officeholders in
determining whether a particular use of campaign funds is
acceptable, the Board adopts the standard used by the Federal
Election Commission which defines as personal use of
campaign funds any use of funds to fulfill a commitment,
obligation or expense of any person that would exist
irrespective ofthe candidate's campaign or responsibilities as
a public officeholder.2"
The Attorney General concluded that the policies announced by the
Supervisory Committee in its advisory opinion "constitutes rules...
which require adoption and promulgation in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act." 73 The Attorney General's opinion
attached special importance to the Supervisory Committee's use of a
268. 99 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 99-130 (Apr. 15, 1999).

269. Louisiana Board of Ethics acting as the Supervisory Committee on
Campaign Finance Disclosure, Op. No. 98-232 (Sept. 17, 1998) [hereinafter
Louisiana Board of Ethics].
270. La. R.S. 18:1505.2(I) (Supp. 2001).
271. Louisiana Board ofEthics, supra note 269.

272. Id.
273. 99 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 99-130 (Apr. 15, 1999).
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"primary purpose" test and its adoption of "standards of the Federal
Election Committee [sic]." In assessing whether the Supervisory
Committee overstepped its authority, abrief overview ofhow agencies
make or interpret law may be helpful.
1. HowAgencies Make andInterpretLaw--An Overview
Agencies can make new law in two ways-by promulgating
regulations (rulemaking) or by rendering decisions in contested cases
(adjudication). When they rely on rulemaking, agencies engage in a
quasi-legislative function, articulating new law through what has been
characterized as a process of "comprehensive rationality."274 When
making new law by adjudication, on the other hand, agencies function
in aquasi-judicial capacity, adopting acase-by-case or "incrementalist"
approach.275
Rulemaking and adjudication procedures differ
significantly with regard to public notice and public participation in
their respective law-making processes, and significant policy
implications flow from the choice of one technique over the other.276
Federal law leaves the choice between rulemaking and
adjudication within the discretion ofthe agency.277 Several states, on
the other hand, have held that rulemaking is the preferred method of

274. Colin S. Diver, PolicymakingParadigmsin AdministrativeLaw, 95 Harv.

L. Rev. 393, 395 (1981) (observing that "comprehensive rationality and

incrementalism represent two competing models of the policymaking process.
Each has its own internal logic: comprehensive rationality is structural, static,

prophylactic; incrementalism isorganic, dynamic, remedial."). See alsoRonald A.

Cass, Models ofAdministrativeAction, 72 Va. L. Rev. 363 (1986); Bonfield, supra

note 107, at 5-7.
275. Bonfield, supranote 107, at 4-5.
276. See, e.g., 1 Frank E. Cooper, State Administrative Law 177-80 (1965).

Rulemaking and adjudication differ significantly with regard to the type of notice,
form of hearing, mechanics of decision, scope of judicial review, trial-type
procedures, introduction of testimony, cross-examination of witnesses, oral
argument, substantial evidence supporting the agency's findings, and prospective

versus retrospective operation of new principles of law. Cooper illustrates with a
hypothetical the specific policy and procedural differences arising out of an
insurance commission's choice between rulemaking and adjudication to review the
reasonableness of astandard clause found innumerous insurance agreements. He
concludes that if"a large number of persons will be affected in substantially the
same manner by the administrative decision, there is much to be said in favor ofthe
utilization of rulemaking techniques." Id. at 179. On the other hand, if "a single

party (or a small, well-defined group) will bear the brunt of the administrative

order, the adoption ofrulemaking techniques may cause hardship to the individuals

affected." Id.at 180.

277. Securities Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 675 S. Ct. 1575
(1947).
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law. 278

making new administrative
The 1981 MSAPA states a strong
preference for rulemaking over adjudication, 279 but it also permits
agencies to announce new law through declaratory orders, which can
be issued by an agency without the need for a formal adjudicative
hearing. 280 Louisiana's APA also clearly contemplates the use of
declaratory orders and rulings, because it requires each agency to
"provide by rule for the filing and prompt disposition ofpetitions for
declaratory orders and rulings" that are accorded "the same status as
agency decisions or orders in adjudicated cases. 2' Despite this
statutory recognition of a proper role for declaratory orders, the
Attorney General's opinion required the Supervisory Committee to
act by rule, prohibiting the use ofan advisory opinion to announce its
interpretation of the law.
How does the prohibited "advisory opinion" differ from an APAapproved "declaratory order or ruling?" The difference is not simply
in who takes the initiative-whether the legal interpretation was
externally requested by some party or internally generated at the
initiative of an agency. The Campaign Finance Disclosure Act (as
quoted in the Attorney General's opinion) clearly draws no such
distinction:
The supervisory committee may render an opinion in
response to a request by any public official, any candidate for
public office, any political committee, orthe committee may
render an advisory opinion on its own initiative. Such an
opinion shall not constitute a rule under the provisions ofthe
Administrative Procedures Act and the supervisory committee
shall not be subject to that Act in carrying out the provisions
of this subsection.282

278. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 393 So. 2d 1177 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Boiler Beverages v. Davis, 183 A.2d 64 (N.J. 1962);
Elizondo v. Dep't of Revenue, 570,P.2d 518 (Colo. 1977); Megdal v. Oregon State
Bd. of Dental Examiners, 605 P.2d 273 (Or. 1980).
279. See Model State Admin. Procedure Act § 2-104(3), 15 U.L.A. 29 (2000)
and the discussion in Bonfield, supra note 107, at 118-3 1.
280. See Model State Admin. Procedure Act § 2-103, 15 U.L.A. 26-27; § 4201(4), 15 U.L.A. 76 (2000). In TransitMgmt. of Southeast Louisiana,Inc. v.
Comm'n on Ethicsfor Public Employees, 703 So. 2d 576, 577 n.1 (La. 1997),
modified on rehearing,710 So. 2d 792 (1998), the Louisiana Supreme Court
observed that the ethics code "does not require notice or a hearing for the rendition
of any advisory opinion."
281. APA § 962 (1987). The definition of a "rule" in APA § 951(6) (Supp.
2001) expressly "does not include declaratory rulings or orders or any fees," so it
is hard to see how an agency's exercise of its power to render a declaratory ruling
could be viewed as thrusting the agency into the realm of rulemaking.
282. La. R.S. 18:1511.2(B) (Supp. 2001) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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Thus, regardless of how it is initiated, an advisory opinion issued by
the Supervisory Committee expressly does "not constitute a rule"
under the APA, and the committee is not bound to follow rulemaking
procedures in rendering such an opinion.
An advisory opinion bears some resemblance to an interpretive
rule.2" 3 Conceptually, interpretive rules reside within the rulemaking
province of agencies. We are currently assessing adjudication (not
rulemaking) in administrative practice, but let us as a working
proposition style the advisory opinion an "interpretive ruling" and
borrow such wisdom as we can from the realm of interpretive rules.
2. "Interpretive"and "Legislative" Pronouncementsby
Agencies
What is an "interpretive" ruling and how does it differ from an
agency's "legislative" or "policy" statements? Compare the
definitions of "interpretative"284 and "legislative" rules given in
Black'sLaw Dictionary:
interpretative rule. AdministrativeLaw. 1. The requirement
that an administrative agency explain the statutes under which it
operates. 2. An administrative rule explaining an agency's
interpretation of a statute. - Also termed interpretiverule. Cf.
LEGISLATIVE RULE.28
legislative rule. An administrative rule created by an agency's
exercise of delegated quasi-legislative authority. A legislative
rule has the force of law. - Also termed substantive rule. Cf.
INTERPRETATIVE RULE.286
The essential difference is between non-binding agency
pronouncements interpreting or explaining the meaning of statutory
law on the one hand (an interpretive rule) and, on the other hand, an
agency's promulgation of administrative law in the form of agency
regulations with binding legal effect (a legislative rule). An
interpretive ruling is more in the nature of a quasi-judicial advisory
283. See Bonfield, supranote 107, at 279-85. An interpretive rule "only defines
the meaning of a statute or other provision of law or precedent [where] the agency
does not possess delegated authority to bind the courts to any extent with its
definition." Model State Admin. Procedure Act § 3-109(a), 15 U.L.A. 45, cmt.

(2000).

284.
but this
285.
286.

The Federal Administrative Procedure Act uses the term "interpretative,"
article follows modem practice in referring to "interpretive" rules.
Black's Law Dictionary 824 (7th ed. 1999).
Id. at 911.

232

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 62

opinion-an opinion rendered in advance of an actual controversy 287
that explains the meaning of a law-rather than a quasi-legislative
promulgation of law itself. In fact, it has been observed that
"[i]nterpretive rules are comparable to opinions issued by state
attorneys general. Indeed,
they are often prepared by counsel for the
288
agency issuing them.
The courts deal very differently with "interpretive" and
"legislative" pronouncements by agencies. When an agency engages
in "legislative" law-making, it exercises authority (delegated to it by
the legislature) to issue law with binding force. 89 Courts defer to the
agency's statement of the law since it derives from delegated
legislative power.290 When it issues an "interpretive" ruling,
however, an agency has no power to make binding statements of
law, 291 and the courts need not defer to the agency's explanation of the
287. In TransitMgmt. ofSoutheast Louisiana, Inc. v. Comm 'n on Ethicsfor
PublicEmployees, 703 So. 2d 576,577 (La. 1997), modifliedon rehearing,710 So.
2d 792 (1998), the supreme court captured the non-binding, "interpretive" nature
of an advisory opinion in the following passage: "The advisory opinion is simply
that-advice. It is not a ruling or action by the Commission that will affect the
person whose conduct or status is questioned, and it cannot be enforced by any
person.... Indeed, there is no justiciable controversy for the courts to decide."
1999 La. Acts No. 252 attempted legislatively to overrule the Court's holding of
"no justiciable controversy" by adding to La. R.S. 42:1142(A) (Supp. 2001) the
following language: "Any advisory opinion issued to any person or governmental
entity by the board.., is subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the appellate
court .... ." The Ethics Administration successfully challenged this language,
arguing that the legislature cannot by statute simply deem that a "case or
controversy" exists and thereby remove from the courts this critical jurisdictional
decision. See Duplantis v. Louisiana Bd. of Ethics, 782 So. 2d 583 (La. 2001).
288. Bonfield, supranote 107, at 282. Interestingly, Attorney General opinions
are themselves exempt from APA rulemaking requirements. See also Model State
Admin. Procedure Act § 3-116(9), 15 U.L.A. 57 (1981). They are "conceptually
similar to interpretive rules," but enjoy a broader exemption under the APA and
additional rationales. Bonfield, supra note 107, at 419.
289. Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements,. Guidances,
Manuals, andthe Like-Should FederalAgencies Use Them to Bind the Public?,
41 Duke L.J. 1311, 1322 (1992), identifies six requirements that must be met in
order for a rule to qualify as "legislative," summarized as follows: an agency
possessing delegated statutory authority over the subject matter and the power to
make rules with the force of law intentionally exercises that power to promulgate
such rules in accordance with procedural requirements. See also 1993 Supplement,
supra note 107, at 213 n.60a (providing useful analysis of "legislative" and
"interpretive" law-making).
290. Anthony, supranote 289, at 1327 n.80 (noting that legislative "rules are
binding and have the force of law" and that "a court may not review them freely,
but must accept them unless they are contrary to statute or unreasonable.").
291. The Model State Admin. Procedure Act § 3-109, 15 U.L.A. 45 (2000)
requires an agency with the authority to issue a binding rule to follow notice and
comment rulemaking procedures; it may not rely on the abbreviated procedures
applicable to issuance of an interpretive rule. 1993 Supplement, supranote 107,

2001]

2DA VID A. MARCELLO

statutory law. In the interpretive context, law is given to the agency in
statutory form; the agency is not making law but rather restating or
explaining it.292 Ifa court disagrees with an agency's interpretation, it
may substitute its own view ofthe matter.
When courts do not need to defer to an agency's interpretive
statements of law, the agency's position is a weak one, vulnerable to
review and reversal by the courts.2 93 Where an agency applies the law to
a specific set of facts found by the agency, however, the agency's
position is stronger because courts defer to an agency's application ofthe
law within its area of primary jurisdiction.294 Thus, ironically,
prohibiting the use of advisory opinions might actually strengthen an
agency's hand by encouraging the agency to apply its interpretation of
the law to a real controversy in an ad hoc adjudication without any prior
warning to the affected party.
The 1981 MSAPA does not require interpretive rules to be
promulgated. in compliance with notice and comment rulemaking
procedures29" for at least two good reasons. First, subjecting interpretive
rules to such procedural constraints simply does not work, as has been
amply demonstrated by the extraordinary level of noncompliance in
states that make the effort to constrain interpretive rulemaking:
[T]here appears to be no means to enforce effectively a
requirement that notice and comment procedures be followed in
interpretive rule making. That is why agencies in virtually all
states requiring notice and comment rule making for interpretive
rules have completely ignored that requirement in practice, and
have done so with impunity. 96
at 134. Federal law takes a different view, allowing an agency with delegated
authority to elect either legislative or interpretive rulemaking at its option. Id. at
135. In Louisiana, the APA makes no provision for interpretive rules-but the
Campaign Finance Disclosure Act does specifically provide for the issuance of

advisory opinions by the Supervisory Committee at its initiative and in its

discretion. Might this provision be construed in a manner similar to federal law,
allowing the Supervisory Committee to issue non-binding interpretive rulings or
binding regulatory promulgations at its option? If so, then the Supervisory
Committee's use of an advisory opinion would constitute a non-binding statement
of the agency's interpretation of the law-an advance insight into how the
committee might interpret the law in the future.
292. Anthony, supranote 289, at 1324 and cases cited intnote 59.

293. 1993 Supplement, supra note 107, at 213 n.60a (observing that "a court

reviewing the legality ofprocedurally proper interpretive law-making need not give
any deference to such agency action" and "a reviewing court may overturn such
law making that is wholly interpretive solely on the ground that the court disagrees

with the agency construction of the statute (or other law) involved.").
294. Bonfield, supra note 107, at 584-85.

295. Model State Admin. Procedure Act § 3-109(a), 15 U.L.A. 45 (2000). See
Bonfield, supra note 1•07, at 283-85.
296. Bonfield, supranote 107, at 285.
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In California, for example, a supreme court ruling required prior
notice and comment before adopting nonlegislative rules. In
response, "[m]ost agencies largely ignored the decision." '97 The
state legislature fared little better when it tried several years later to
mandate prior notice and comment because "[m]any agencies...
ignored the requirements" while "[o]thers complied with the
requirements but issued fewer nonlegislative rules. 298
'
The supply of interpretive rules is highly "elastic,"299
so
imposing additional burdens on agency personnel like "notice and
comment will shift the supply curve for nonlegislative rules to the
left" and "fewer will be produced."300 Any reduction in interpretive
rules adversely affects the public more than the agency because:
the purpose of nonlegislative rules is to diminish
uncertainty. For the most part, the costs of uncertainty are
borne by members ofthe public, not by the agency. For that
reason, uncertainty is an externality that agency utilitymaximizers need not take into account. Thus an agency
may well choose to muddle through without producing any
guidance documents, or it may choose to tiansmit any
necessary guidance to its staffthrough informal intra-agency
memoranda, hallway conversations, or other subformal
communications. It may feel little or no compulsion to issue
30 1
a steady flow of publicly available nonlegislative rules.
Far from "protecting" the public, requiring notice and comment
rulemaking actually deprives the public and affected parties of
important agency guidance on unclear policies.
Thus, the second rationale supporting the MSAPA provision on
interpretive rules is an underlying policy assumption that the public
benefits when agencies use interpretive rules, which Bonfield states
as follows: "The issuance of such rules ... should be encouraged
in the public interest rather than discouraged by subjecting their
issuance to unnecessary procedural requirements."3 02 Encouraging
297.

Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform,

1985 Duke L.J. 381, 407 (1985) [hereinafter Asimow].

298. Id. at 408.

299. "Interpretive rules and policy statements are different from other
bureaucratic outputs in one critical respect: a regulatoryprogram can function

without them." Id. at 405 (emphasis inoriginal).

300. Id. at 406. Imposing procedural burdens on the issuance of interpretive

rules carries other negative consequences as well, including reliance on

"underground regulations."
Michael Asimow, California Underground
Regulations, 44 Admin. L. Rev. 43, 55-61 (1992).

301. Id. at 405.
302. Bonfield, supra note 107, at 289 n.5 (citingAdministrativeProcedureAct:
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agencies to issue as many interpretive rules as possible protects the
public by giving notice-in advance--of how the agency interprets the
laws that it administers. "In the absence of interpretive rules," by
contrast, "agency interpretations would be made on an ad hoc basis in
adjudicatory proceedings and applied retroactively. As a result,
members of the public would not enjoy the advantage of being
forewared...."303
The Attorney General's opinion does some disservice 0 4 to the
parties who would be most affected by the Supervisory
Committee's advisory opinion, depriving them of advance insight
into the agency's interpretation of the campaign finance laws. In
addition, the Attorney General's sweeping prohibition on advisory
opinions may actually accomplish very little-just as the procedural
constraints on interpretive rulemaking often accomplish very little
because agencies have other avenues by which to achieve the same
result.
The Supervisory Committee could still apply its
interpretation of the "personal" and "political" use of funds in ad
hoc decision making and enforcement of the Campaign Finance
Disclosure Act. It would do so, however, to the detriment of an
individual who is thereby retrospectively regulated, rather than
having put everyone on notice in advance (without penalty) of the
Board's view of these matters.
Another reason for encouraging rather than prohibiting
interpretive rulings by agencies is the ready availability of effective
post-hoc remedies. As already noted, an agency's inappropriate
interpretation of the law can be corrected by a court's de novo
review of the matter.3" 5 And even before resorting to litigation,
anyone dissatisfied with an agency's interpretive ruling can petition
the agency to change it through a conventional rulemaking process
with full notice and comment protections.30 6
HearingsBefore the UnitedStates Senate Subcomm. on AdministrativePractice
and Procedureon S.1663, 88th Cong. 145, 2d Sess. (1964)). See also Hearings
Before the United States Senate Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and
Procedureon S.1160, S.1336, S.1758 and S.1879, 89th Cong. 384, 1st Sess.
(1965).
303. Bonfield, supranote 107, at 289 (citations omitted).
304. Michael Asimow contends that requiring "agencies to employ notice and
comment procedures before adopting many nonlegislative rules . .. would
discourage agencies from adopting nonlegislative rules and thus would
dramatically disserve the public interest." Asimow, supra note 297, at 381.
Asimow also contends that "the costs of mandatory advance public participation
in the making ofnonlegislative rules outweighs the benefits." Id. at 382.
305. Bonfield, supranote 107, at 581 ("[C]ourts may normally substitute their
judgment de novo for that of the agencies on issues of law" because "legislatures
usually do not delegate authority to agencies to bind the courts, to any extent, with
agency interpretations of law.").
306. APA § 953(C) (1987 and Supp. 2001).
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3. Distinguishing"InterpretiveRules" and "Policy
Statements
The Supervisory Committee wanted to explain the meaning ofthe
statutory phrase "personal use unrelated to apolitical campaign or the
holding ofa public office or party position." ' The Attorney General
found that the Supervisory Committee had gone beyond merely
"explaining" the statutory language when it articulated a "primary
purpose" test and adopted "the standard used by the Federal Election
The pertinent question is whether these
Commission."
pronouncements constituted substantive changes in the law governing
campaign finance violations (therefore requiring promulgation under
"legislative" rulemaking procedures) or whether they are best regarded
as non-binding "interpretive" language. To answer this question we
must first articulate a distinction between "interpretive rules" and
"policy statements:"
An interpretive rule clarifies or explains the meaning ofwords
used in a statute, a previous agency rule, or ajudicial or agency
adjudicative decision. A policy statement, on the other hand,
indicates how an agency hopes or intends to exercise
discretionary power in the course of performing some other
administrative function. For example, apolicy statement might
indicate what factors will be considered and what goals will be
pursued when an agency conducts investigation, prosecution,
legislative rulemaking, or formal or informal adjudication. 08
Applying the distinction in practice remains an elusive enterprise:
"[t]rying to distinguish interpretive rules from policy statements is as
difficult as trying to separate legal issues from discretionary issues (or
perhaps those are two facets ofthe very same enigma)."3 9
The degree of specificity in statutory language that an advisory
opinion seeks to explain is critical. If the legislative terminology is
sufficiently specific, then the agency can fairly be said to "extract"
meaning from the statute. But ifthe statutory language is too general
to supply much intrinsic meaning, thenthe agency effectively "creates"
new law that must be promulgated through legislative rulemaking
procedures.
For example, the Federal Trade Commission successfully relies on
the statutory phrase "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" when it
articulates specific examples ofmisrepresentation or deception. These
307. La. R.S. 18:1505.21(I)(1) (Supp. 2001).
308. Asimow, supra note 297, at 383 (citations omitted).
309. Ronald M. Levin, NonlegislativeRules andthe AdministrativeOpenMind,
41 Duke L.J. 1497, 1505 (1992).
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"statutory words are broad but nevertheless have some tangible
meaning when applied in a 'negative' way, that is, to condemn acts
which by common usage or general acceptance are'unfair or fraudulent
or tricky." 31" By contrast,
A rule that purported to interpret a vacuous statutory term like
"just and reasonable" or "public interest, convenience and
necessity" would not be interpretive; if it were issued by
legislative rulemaking, it would be a legislative
rule, but ifnot,
31
such a rule would be a policy statement. '
Whether the advisory opinion at issue in this discussion should be
viewed as interpretive or legislative depends upon the degree of
tangible meaning we attribute to the "personal use" terminology. The
reference to "personal use unrelated to a political campaign or the
holding of a public office or party position" seems more "tangible"
rather than "vacuous" terminology, and accordingly, it should support
explanatory interpretive pronouncements by the Supervisory
Committee. Whether the terminology supports the committee's
adoption of a "primary purpose" test and of the Federal Election
Commission standard remains a close question. Because it is such
a close question in this instance, the Attorney General's opinion
should not be regarded in the future as a blanket prohibition on
agencies' use of advisory opinions to clarify the meaning of statutes
they enforce.
4. Conclusion
Denying an agency the use of an advisory opinion to tell the
public how it will interpret laws within the agency's area of
expertise seems needlessly restrictive, particularly since an advisory
opinion has only prospective effect. By announcing to the public
the agency's interpretation of the law on such matters in the future
(and not applying any punitive measures against previous conduct),
the advisory opinion is "fairer" than adjudication in a contested case
(where someone pays the price of not having anticipated the new
agency law). The advisory opinion is also more efficient than
rulemaking, enabling an agency (such as the Board of Ethics) to
address an area of need both quickly and comprehensively. If, as
310. Anthony, supranote 289, at 1339 n. 161 (citing Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553, 55 S. Ct. 837, 853 (1935) (Cardozo, J.,
concurring)).
311. Anthony, supranote 289, 1325 n.62. But see Friedrich v. Sec'y of Health
& Human Servs., 894 F.2d 829, 837 (6th Cir. 1990), where an agency's
explanation of the relatively vacuous phrase "reasonable and necessary" was
nonetheless held to be interpretive in nature.
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suggested, advisory opinions are indeed fairer than adjudication and
more efficient than rulemaking, then denying an agency that
capability seems an inappropriate and unwise restriction of
administrative discretion.
D. SeparationofProsecutionand Adjudication Functionsin
Agency Counsel
The Louisiana Supreme Court significantly altered
administrative practice with its decisions in Allen v. State Board of
Dentistr, 12 and GeorgiaGulf Corp. v. Board ofEthicsfor Public
3 3 Administrative practice in Louisiana now requires a
Employees."
separation of functions between the prosecution and adjudication
tasks performed by agency counsel, but the precise dimensions31of
4
the separation remain in a state ofjurisprudential development.
Louisiana's APA deals most directly with the separation of
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in its prohibition of ex
parte communications with agency decision makers:
[M]embers or employees of an agency assigned to render a
decision or to make findings offact and conclusions oflaw in
a case of adjudication ... shall not communicate ... in
connection with an issue of fact or law.., with any officer,
employee, or agent- engaged in the performance of
investigative, prosecuting, or advocating functions, except
3
upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate. '
Both the Federal and Model State Administrative Procedure Acts
prohibit such communication by a presiding officer or employee
charged with decision making responsibility, except upon "notice and
an opportunity for all parties to participate."3"6 The federal and model
state acts also prohibit agency personnel who have performed
investigative or prosecutorial functions from advising the agency
decision maker.31 7 This would prohibit agency counsel who have
been engaged in these functions from counseling the agency's
adjudicators, but would apparently still allow other agency lawyers
312. 543 So. 2d 908 (La. 1989).
313. 694 So. 2d 173 (La. 1997).
314. CompareGeorgia Gulf Corp. v. Bd. ofEthics, 694 So. 2d 173 (La. 1997),

with Inre Ronald Bankston and Lounges, 761 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2000).
315. APA § 960(A) (1987).

316. Administrative Procedure Act § 554(d), 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1994); Model
State Admin. Procedure Act § 4-213(a), 15 U.L.A. 92 (2000). See generally
Michael Asimow, When the CurtainFalls:SeparationofFunctionsin the Federal
AdministrativeAgencies, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 759 (1981).
317. Administrative Procedure Act § 554(d), 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1994); Model
State Admin. Procedure Act § 4-214(a), 15 U.L.A. 94 (2000).
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to play an advisory role. But the MSAPA prohibits a "person who is
subject to the authority, direction, or discretion ofone who has served
as investigator, prosecutor, or advocate in an adjudicative
proceeding" from assisting or advising "a presiding officer in the
same proceeding. '318 This last prohibitory language apparently would
prevent subordinate lawyers in an agency's legal division from
counseling a presiding officer where the chief legal counsel of the
agency has served as investigator, prosecutor, or advocate.
IV.

WHAT LIES AHEAD

What more might be done to improve administrative practice in
Louisiana? Several statutory reforms could be made (all of them
compatible with Louisiana's current constitutional regime) to
significantly enhance the fairness, openness, and ease of state
administrative practice.
A. Advance Notice ofRulemaking
Agencies should alert the public to possible rulemaking initiatives
at the earliest stages ofagency consideration, even before publication
of a Notice of Intent in the Louisiana Register. Advance notice of
proposed rulemaking involves publishing a staff report or advisory
group recommendation and inviting public comment while the draft
is still in development.319 The 1981 MSAPA provides for notice of
possible rules and the solicitation of public comments by state
agencies,32 0 including provision for a rulemaking docket that lists
"each possible rule currently under active consideration within the
agency" and "the name and address of agency personnel with whom
persons may communicate with respect to the matter."3 ' For two
decades the federal government has required agencies to give public
318.

Model State Admin. Procedure Act § 4-214(b), 15 U.L.A. 94 (2000).

319. See discussion in James T. O'Reilly, Administrative Rulemaking:

Structuring, Opposing, and Defending Federal Agency Regulations 72-75 (1983)
[hereinafter O'Reilly].

. 320. Model State Admin. Procedure Act § 3-101(a), 15 U.L.A. 34 (2000): "In
addition to seeking information by other methods, an agency ... may solicit
comments from the public on a subject matter ofpossible rule making under active
consideration within the agency by causing notice to be published.... ." Several
states (Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, Virginia,

Washington) have incorporated similar provisions into their APA as a voluntary
component ofthe rulemaking process. See 1993 Supplement, supranote 107, at

94.

321. Model State Admin. Procedure Act §3-102(b), 15 U.L.A. 35 (2000). For
state laws incorporating similar requirements, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §41-1021
(West 1999); N.Y. A.P.A. Law § 202-d (McKinney 1995 and Supp. 2001); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 34.05.315 (West 1990).
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notice of rules that are under development or being considered for
withdrawal during the next twelve months by publishing a regulatory
agenda and a central calendar.322 The concept is embodied in federal
legislation requiring the Consumer Product Safety Commission to
commence its rulemaking proceedings with the publication of an
32 3
advance notice ofproposed rulemaking.
Advance notice would do much to "level the playing field" in state
administrative practice. Agency personnel are often predisposed to
consult industry representatives in advance of rulemaking because of
a measure's obvious relevance to the industry's economic interests. 324
But the same agency staffmay be less sensitive to the need for advance
consultation with representatives of a broader public, whose more
"diffuse" interests are less obviously affected. Well-financed interests
can afford to employ a corps of in-house and contract personnel who
maintain relationships with agency staff and monitor their actions.
These monied interests enjoy corresponding advantages over their less
well-funded opponents in the administrative process.
And what an advantage it is to gain access to agency personnel
when a rule is still in its earliest formative stages! Before pen is set to
paper, before policy is even preliminarily determined by a draft, before
staff become invested in a particular approach to the problem-that is
when the most meaningful influence can be had. 325 Advance notice of
rulemaking promotes equal access to agency process-for everyone,
notjust for the privileged few who can afford to maintain a year-round
presence with agency staff.
B. NegotiatedRulemaking
Advance notice of rulemaking leads naturally into another
worthwhile innovation-negotiated rulemaking. By publicizing in
advance the rulemaking initiatives it is considering, an agency invites
322. Exec. Order No. 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). See discussion of agendas
and calendars in O'Reilly, supra note 319, at 70-72.

323. Consumer Prod. Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2058(a) (1994).
324. See Richard B. Stewart, The ReformationofAmerican AdministrativeLaw,
88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1775 (1975) ("[T]he content of rulemaking decisions is
often largely determined in advance through a process of informal consultation in
which organized interests may enjoy a preponderant influence").
325. Bonfield discusses ("Prerule-making Notice and Comment") how public
input at the earliest stage of policy formulation is "more likely to influence an
agency than public input in later stages of the rule-making process." Bonfield,

supra note 107, at 157-61. Particularly after the agency publishes notice of its
proposed rule in the state register, "agency personnel may have psychologically
committed themselves to the specific text of the proposed rule. Under those
circumstances, it is unlikely that an agency will significantly revise a rule as a
result of subsequent public comments." Id. at 157-58 (citing Stewart, supra note
324, at 1775).

2001]

DAVID A. MARCELLO

the affected interests to sit down with agency personnel and with
other stakeholders for a pre-publication discussion of the proposed

rule.326 In the conventional notice and comment rulemaking, critical
commentary and the clash ofinterests frequently follow publication

of a Notice of Intent, when parties are confronted with the text of a
proposed new rule that has already been drafted with no public
input.327 Negotiated rulemaking, on the other hand, involves
interested parties in a pre-text policymaking dialogue, working
toward consensus on a proposed new rule.
Congress enacted the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990328 to
encourage federal agencies to use negotiated rulemaking (sometimes
called "regulatory negotiation" or "reg-neg"). 2 9 This approach to
rulemaking had already surfaced in environmental agency
proceedings. Based on earlier experiences, the Administrative

Conference of the United States recommended various criteria for

agencies to consider in evaluating whether to engage in negotiated
rulemaking.330 The Negotiated Rulemaking Act uses permissive
language that allows parties to the proceeding to vary their
approaches. A willing state agency might engage in negotiated

rulemaking even without the benefit of a statutory framework.33'

326. The Center for Public Policy Dispute Resolution at the University ofTexas
School of Law has published a "Texas Negotiated Rulemaking Deskbook" that
discusses what negotiated rulemaking is (and is not), its benefits and drawbacks,
criteria for identifying good candidates for negotiated rulemaking, and a step-bystep guide to the process. Information about obtaining copies can be found on the
Center's website, at <http://www.utexas.edu/law/acadprogs/cppdr/pubs> (visited
Oct. 23, 2001).
327. Regarding the conventional consequences of notice-and-comment
rulemaking, see Philip J. Halter, Negotiating Regulations: A Curefor Malaise,71
Geo. L.J. 1 (1982).
328. Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 561-570
(1994)).
329. Cornelius M. Kerwin, Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law
and Make Policy 185 (Congressional Quarterly, 1999) (tracing the origins ofreg.
neg "back nearly sixty years to the Fair Labor Standards Act .
330. Administrative Conference of the United States Recommendations 82-4
and 85-5, 1 C.F.R. 305.82-4 (1983), 305.85-5 (1986). The criteria are embodied
in the Act at 5 U.S.C. § 563 (1994).
331. The Public Law Center (TPLC) participated in just such a negotiated
rulemaking process in 1989. 1989 La. Acts No. 719, codified at La. R.S.
40:2009.23 (2001) (originally enacted as La. R.S. 40:2009.51), directed DHH to
promulgate a system of intermediate sanctions for enforcement of nursing home
regulations in order to bring Louisiana into compliance with directives of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987. The legislative battle preceding
passage ofAct 719 was hard fought and highly controversial; the promulgation of
regulations promised to be equally contentious. DHH elected to draft the
regulations by convening interested stakeholders in a task force that consisted of
TPLC and its clients, Citizens for Quality Nursing Home Care and the Louisiana
Chapter of the American Association of Retired Persons; the Louisiana Nursing
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C. Rulemaking at the Local orMunicipalLevel of Government
Many of the same policy arguments in favor of notice and
comment rulemaking at the state level apply with equal force to the
promulgation ofregulations by local government, but rarely do APAstyle protections apply. Inmost localjurisdictions across the country,
for example, the Director of the Department of Finance could retire
to the office on a Tuesday afternoon, affix a signature at the bottom
of a sheaf of papers, and on Wednesday begin collecting city taxes
pursuant to a new body ofregulatory law. Why should that continue
to be the case at the municipal level of government when we have
long since prohibited such opaque and undemocratic practices at the
state level?
The City of New Orleans leads the way in Louisiana with recent
revisions to its Home Rule Charter requiring a notice and comment
procedure comparable to that found in the APA.332 An ordinance
implementing the Home Rule Charter mandate establishes
procedures for the publication of proposed and final municipal
regulations.333 The procedures apply to any "municipal entity,"
which includes "any city board, commission, department, officer, or
other entity of city government, including but not limited to public
benefit corporations. ' ' 334 A municipal entity proposing regulations
must publish notice of its intent at least once in the official journal,
hold a public hearing, and consider "all comments and suggestions,
written or oral, made at or as a result of the aforesaid public hearing
... in formulating the version ofproposed regulations to be submitted

Home Association, representing for-profit homes; and the Louisiana Association
of Homes and Services for the Aged, representing nonprofit homes. A series often
or more meetings, chaired by a DHH staffmember, resulted in a consensus on all
but a few items, and the regulations were ultimately promulgated with little
opposition. 16 La. Reg. 310,315,317,318(1990). The success of this procedure
led DHH to reconvene the task force participants in a renewed rulemaking
negotiation when 1990 La. Acts No. 859, codified La. R.S. 40:2009.11, 2009.15,
2009.17, 2009.20 (2001), directed the agency to promulgate enforcement
procedures and a schedule of fines of up to $5000 per day. Once again, the process
yielded regulations that were promulgated with minimal opposition. 18 La. Reg.
189 (1992). These successful negotiations in a potentially difficult subject area
were conducted voluntarily by DHH and the interested parties without the benefit
of any statutory construct.
332. Home Rule Charter of the City of New Orleans § 4-107(3) (effective Jan.
1, 1996), availableat<http://www.nocitycouncil.com/content/TheCouncil/Charter
Content/Sec4 101-109.asp>,
333. M.C.S., Ord. No. 17,611 (June 20, 1996) (codified as New Orleans, La.,
Code of Ordinances art. XI, § 2-1000 (1996)).
334. New Orleans, La., Code of Ordinances art. XI, § 2-1000(a)(1) (1996).
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for consideration by the council. 335 Within thirty days after its
public hearing, the entity must "submit to the chief administrative
officer and the council the proposed regulations and a report detailing
the comments and suggestions made at the municipal entity's public
hearing," as well as an assessment ofthe fiscal impact.336 Copies of
the regulations must be available on the premises and at the New
Orleans Public Library for public review. 331 The regulations are then
approved or disapproved by the council, becoming effective fortyfive days after submission to the council if it takes no action. 338 Final
regulations must be published in the official journal or in a city
register. 339 Emergency adoption is permissible when "an imminent
peril to public health, safety, or welfare req1uires immediate
implementation of new or amended regulations. ' I
Legislation mandating APA-style procedures for the adoption of
rules at the local or municipal level ofgovernment would need to be
crafted with careful attention to several constitutional provisions.
Article VI, Section 6 prohibits new laws affecting the structure or
distribution ofpowers within a home rule jurisdiction.34 ' Article VI,
Section 14 prohibits new laws that would increase the "financial
burden" on local government.342 These constitutional provisions
present challenges, but not necessarily insurmountable obstacles, to
the implementation of some statewide mandate for rulemaking by
local government entities.
V. CONCLUSION: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY

CC 73 laid a sound foundation for administrative practice in
Louisiana. Some of its constitutional reforms have endured or even
flourished, but in many instances the legislature has failed to build on
those reforms-or worse, has reversed them.
335. Id. at § 2-1000(c).
336. Id. at § 2-1000(d).
337. Id. at § 2-1000(e).
338. Id. at § 2-1000(g).
339. Id. at § 2-1000(h).
340. Id.at § 2-1000(i).
341. "The legislature shall enact no law the effect of which changes or affects
the structure and organization or the particular distribution or redistribution of the
powers and functions of any local governmental subdivision which operates under
a home rule charter." La. Const. art. VI, § 6.
342. "No law or state executive order, rule, or regulation requiring increased
expenditures for any purpose shall become effective within a political subdivision
until approved by ordinance enacted, or resolution adopted, by the governing
authority of the affected political subdivision" unless the legislature appropriates
funds or provides a local source of revenue to support the new requirement. La.
Const. art. VI, § 14(A).
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What is the "good" news in administrative practice? Two of CC
73's most significant accomplishments were the new constitution's
exemplary principles of openness in agency process and a muchneeded executive branch reorganization. Since 1974, technological
developments such as the Internet have significantly enhanced the
public's access to agency law, which is more readily available today
than ever before. Louisiana's public records and open meetings laws
continue to be strong vehicles for protecting the public's right of
access to public information and deliberations.3 43 However, with
regard to reorganization of the executive branch-the second great
administrative achievement of CC 73-we find a mixed picture.
In the eyes of some beholders, the "bad" news is backsliding on
the reorganization and reduction ofexecutive branch agencies, which
began to grow in number almost immediately after the initial
implementation of CC 73's mandate. But undeniably, some new
agencies now on the scene, such as the Department ofEnvironmental
Quality, respond to important new needs that were barely on the radar
screen in 1974. A blanket indictment ofagency growth is suspect on
its face. Proper evaluation of developments in this area should be
more discrete, looking at specific entities created since the 1970s and
assessing their role in state government on a case-by-case basis. A
balanced evaluation would also have to recognize that the legislature
continues to eliminate various inactive or dormant boards and
commissions from time to time.3 "
The truly "bad" news in administrative practice has been the
infiltration ofspecial interest legislation into the APA under the guise
of administrative reform.
Special regulations that govern
environmental policymaking have undermined uniformity in
administrative practice and diminished the efficiency and
effectiveness of environmental agencies.345 Another regrettable
343. 2001 La. Acts, Reg. Sess., No. 882 consolidated and enumerated for the

first time in the Public Records Act all exceptions, exemptions, and limitations
scattered throughout the revised statutes. The legislation lays a predicate for
comprehensive review and revision of the many exceptions, exemptions, and
limitations, which might lead in a subsequent session to the elimination of some
provisions and a further strengthening ofthe public records doctrine in Louisiana.
344. See, e.g., 2001 La. Acts, Reg. Sess., No. 1137.
345. Bonfield raises the question in his 1993 Supplement whether it is "time
now to abandon such generally applicable administrative procedure acts in favor
of agency-specific procedural legislation?" 1993 Supplement, supranote 107, at
4-5. He notes that "any effort to abandon general APA's in favor of separate
administrative procedure legislation specially tailored for the circumstances ofeach
individual agency would fly in the face of the extensive earlier experience of our
federal and state governments." Id.at 5. Those experiences and earlier empirical
studies suggest that general and comprehensive APA legislation strikes the right

balance "between the need for adequate procedural protection ofprivate rights and
the need for efficient and effective government." Id.. Bonfield acknowledges "the
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development has been the steady growth in time needed to
promulgate regulations under the APA, making it more difficult and
expensive for agencies to perform their functions.346
One "ugly" aspect of administrative practice is legislative excess
in the use of concurrent regulations to suspend and amend agency
regulations. Section 969 of the APA represents a perversion of the
constitutional suspension power drafted by CC 73 delegates. The
legislature should not be in the business of circumventing the
separation of powers by rewriting agency regulations. The courts
must decide whether Chadha principles apply to the legislative
oversight of agency rulemaking in Louisiana, and if so, whether
statutory suspension and other legislative vetoes pass constitutional
muster.
Equally "ugly" in adjudication practice are the final, unappealable
decisions rendered by AL's. Such determinations remove decision
making from the realm of agency expertise and undermine the
administrative adjudication process.
The APA's treatment of fees is, if not ugly, at least inelegant. In
an ideal world, some effort might be made to clean up the historical
anomaly that now has "fees" excluded from the definition ofa"rule,"
but nonetheless subjects them to the same rulemaking procedures that
govern the promulgation of a rule. The APA might also be amended
to clarify and reaffirm agency authority in issuing advisory
opinions-a desirable capability that could be discouraged by the
Attorney General's opinion restricting the practice. Finally, the
proper separation between prosecutorial and adjudicative functions
ought not to be elaborated entirely through jurisprudence. The APA
should address these matters affirmatively in new legislation that
delineates appropriate procedures in this area of agency practice.
Not every improvement depends upon new state legislation.
More could be done to accommodate openness and participation in
rulemaking at the local level of government, where most regulatory
law still emerges with little public notice or scrutiny of the process.
State legislation might help in achieving this objective, but localities
need not await such instruction from above in order to begin moving
in that direction, as evidenced by the City ofNew Orleans' process
for promulgating municipal regulations. Similarly, in the realm of
negotiated rulemaking, agencies at both the state and local levels of
government can introduce consensus-building procedures into the
desirability, in appropriate instances, of special procedural legislation concerning

a particular agency" but nonetheless concludes "that for most situations general
APAs have distinct advantages over agency-specific legislation." Id.
346. -Compare, for example, Louisiana's minimum of one hundred days to
promulgate new regulations with the substantially shorter time periods required in
other states. 1993 Supplement, supra note 107, at 96.
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rulemaking process on their own initiative. They need not await a
legislative framework in which to implement this worthy objective.
State agencies could also institute advance notice of rulemaking at
their own initiative bythe simple expedient ofperiodically publishing
in the Louisiana Register a list ofmatters under consideration and the
name of a contact person within the agency.
Agencies could also do more to put their own house in order by
taking care of "unfinished business." The Office of State Register
should move as quickly as possible to complete the codification of
state regulations in the Louisiana Administrative Code and thereafter
to supplement and revise it "at least once every two years."34' 7 Every
agency in state government should comply with the APA's directive
to "provide by rule for the filing and prompt disposition ofpetitions
for declaratory orders and rulings as to the applicability of any
statutory provision or ofany rule or order ofthe
agency. 3 4 Instead,
"most" agencies appear out of compliance. 49
This "silver anniversary" review of administrative practice under
the 1974 Constitution has revealed a trend (accelerating in recent
years) toward weakening and obstructing the policymaking
prerogatives of agencies. In practical effect if not by design,
numerous aspects of administrative structure and process have been
rendered less vigorous today than when the new Constitution was
adopted in 1974. And as a subordinate theme, many of the measures
undermining the role ofagencies appear responsive to interests whose
particular focus is on environmental policymaking.
These developments are not the "legacy" of CC 73. The 1974
Constitution provided a good framework for reform and progress in
administrative practice. Not all of the legislation enacted since 1974
has served the constitution well, but that is no reflection on the work
done by CC 73 delegates and by such major staff contributors as
Professor Lee Hargrave, the honoree of this symposium edition. A
good constitution simply provides the framework within which voters
and state officials subsequently implement their own ad hoc policy
judgments. The battle for good policy did not end with CC 73. Itjust
began then, and it is still underway.

347. APA § 954.1(A) (1987 and Supp. 2001).
348. APA § 962 (1987).
349. "Most agencies.., have not complied with the statutory duty to issue the

necessary procedural rules for issuing declaratory orders," despite the apparently
mandatory nature of the language. Murchison, supra note 123, at 878 n.200.

